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This  report  introduces  a  systemic  process  for  an  initial  hazard  analysis  in  the  operative  context  of 
autonomous vessels. The process facilitates executing an initial analysis of safety hazards in the earliest 
design  phase before  the  planning of  ship  design, materials,  structures,  components,  systems  and  the 
services linked to the functioning of an autonomous vessel. The process attempts to produce information 
to make the systematic  integration of safety controls that need to be  implemented  in an  initial safety 
management strategy. 
In  this  report,  the process  is applied  to analyse  the  safety hazards  in  the  foreseen  functioning of  two 
concepts of autonomous ferries operating in urban waterways in and near the city of Turku in Finland. 
The process first  identifies the main type of accidents and hazards  in the operational context of these 
ferries. It then proposes high‐level safety controls to mitigate the hazards and prevent these accidents. 
The controls are subsequently used as a basis for developing an initial safety management strategy for 
autonomous  ferries and  their operational  system. This provides  a  systematic  representation of  safety 
controls in the operative context of autonomous ferries. 
The full process is composed of five different steps to elaborate a systematic analysis of hazards and to 
define safety controls for mitigating and preventing the identified hazards. These controls are the basis of 
the initial safety management strategy of autonomous vessels and their operational system. This report 
was done as part of the ÄlyVESI – Smart City Ferries research, development and innovation project.  
Smart  City  Ferries,  the ÄlyVESI  project, was  a  conceptualisation,  product  development  and  innovation 
project  realised  by  cities,  businesses  and  universities  1.10.2016  –  31.5.2018.  The  project  explored, 
developed and tested new technologies and intelligent urban waterborne traffic solutions and services. 
Novia University of Applied Sciences, Turku University of Applied Sciences, Aalto University and the City of 
Turku  carried  out  the  project  in  co‐operation.  The  project  was  funded  by  the  6Aika‐program  of  the 
European Regional Development Fund. In addition, the project was funded by the Finnish Transport Safety 
Agency and the cities of Helsinki and Espoo.  
Sve: 
Denna rapport introducerar en systematisk process för en inledande riskanalys gällande autonoma 
fartygs operation. Denna process underlättar utförandet av en inledande analys av säkerhetsrisker i det 
tidiga design skedet före planeringen av fartyget, dess material, strukturer, komponenter och system 
och de tjänster som är anknutna till hur ett autonomt fartyg fungerar. På basen av denna process 
försöker man säkerställa ändamålsenlig information för integreringen av de systematiska 
säkerhetskontroller som bör vara implementerade i en inledande säkerhetsstrategi.  
I denna rapport tillämpas säkerhetsriskanalysen på två planerade koncept där autonoma färjor opererar 
i urbana farvatten i och i närheten av Åbo stad i Finland. Processen identifierar först huvudtyperna av 
olyckor och risker i färjornas operativa kontext. Sedan föreslås elementära säkerhetskontroller för att 
minska riskerna och undvika olyckor. Kontrollerna tillämpas därefter som en bas för utvecklingen av en 
inledande säkerhetsstrategi för autonoma färjor och dessas operativsystem. Detta möjliggör en 
systematisk representation gällande säkerhetskontroller för operation av autonoma färjor.  
Hela processen består av fem olika steg för att utveckla en systematisk analys av risker och för att 
definiera säkerhetskontroller för att minska eller förhindra de identifierade riskerna. Dessa kontroller är 
basen för den inledande säkerhetsstrategin för autonoma fartyg och deras operativ system. Denna 
rapport är en del av ÄlyVESI‐ Smarta Stadsfärjor forsknings‐, utvecklings‐ och innovationsprojektet.  
Smarta Stadsfärjor, ÄlyVESI projektet, var ett konceptifierings‐, produktutvecklings‐  och 
innovationsprojekt förverkligat av städer, företag och universitet under tiden 1.10.2016 – 31.5.2018. 
Projektet undersökte, utvecklande och testade nya teknologier och intelligent urban sjövägstrafik och 
tjänster. Projektet utfördes som ett samarbete mellan Yrkeshögskolan Novia, Turun 
Ammattikorkeakoulu, Aalto‐yliopisto och Åbo stad. Projektet finansierades av 6Aika‐programmet och 
Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden. Därtill finansierades projektet av Trafiksäkerhetsverket och 
städerna, Helsingfors och Esbo.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Autonomous vessels need to operate with the support of entire smart systems (Vermesan and Friess 
2013). The industry involved in the development of autonomous vessels is aware about this and are 
constantly investing to create smart autonomous maritime systems (Teivainen 2017). Safety 
represents an essential aspect for ensuring the correct functioning of such a system. Autonomous 
vessels have the initial expectation that they have to be at least as safe as the most advanced manned 
ships (Rødseth and Burmeister, 2015; Jalonen et al. 2017). ÄlyVESI - Smart City Ferries is an R&D and 
innovation project between cities, technology companies and universities. The aim is to research and 
develop new solutions and services for intelligent transport. The project enables companies to 
develop new business in the marine technology and ICT sectors, at the same time keeping 
management and design of safety as one of the main priorities. 
 
This report introduces a systemic process for an initial hazard analysis in the operative context of 
autonomous vessels. The process facilitates executing an initial analysis of safety hazards in the 
earliest design phase before the planning of ship design, materials, structures, components, systems 
and the services linked to the functioning of an autonomous vessel. The process attempts to produce 
information to make the systematic integration of safety controls that need to be implemented in an 
initial safety management strategy. 
 
In this report, the process is applied to analyse the safety hazards in the foreseen functioning of two 
concepts of autonomous ferries operating in urban waterways in and near the city of Turku in Finland. 
The process first identifies the main type of accidents and hazards in the operational context of these 
ferries. It then proposes high-level safety controls to mitigate the hazards and prevent these accidents. 
The controls are subsequently used as a basis for developing an initial safety management strategy 
for autonomous ferries and their operational system. This provides a systematic representation of 
safety controls in the operative context of autonomous ferries. 
 
The full process is composed of five different steps to elaborate a systematic analysis of hazards and 
to define safety controls for mitigating and preventing the identified hazards. These controls are the 
basis of the initial safety management strategy of autonomous vessels and their operational system. 
This initial safety management strategy provides itemized information that is relevant for planning, 
designing and constructing autonomous vessels and their entire operational system. The execution of 
steps one to four produces itemized information that is systematically connected. Step five focuses 
on representing the main components emerged from the analysis: the hazards, their safety controls, 
the logic principle of the safety controls, and the link to the accidents that these listed components 
aim to prevent or respond to. The entire process is described in Section 3.2. 
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2. Background 
 
The hazard analysis presented in this study focuses on two specific concepts of autonomous ferries 
for urban transport. 
 
Autonomous ferry “A”  
This first concept has a mission to transport passengers across the Aura River in the city of Turku. The 
distance navigated by this ferry is about 100 meters in total. The total passenger capacity for this 
autonomous ferry is not yet defined but current ferries (man controlled) with similar missions in the 
same operational area have a maximum capacity of 75 passengers. The operational function of the 
ferries is described as follows: 
 
a) Passengers board the ferry while she is docked 
b) The boarding process is finalized 
b.1) The access gate on the pier is closed 
b.2) The access door on the vessel in closed  
c) The ferry undocks 
d) The ferry begins her voyage  
e) The ferry reaches the other side of the river and docks 
f) The passengers disembark the ferry (after this is concluded operation “a” is repeated) 
 
Autonomous ferry “B”  
This second concept has the mission to transport passengers from downtown Turku to the Island of 
Ruissalo. The ferry will navigate in the river Aura, navigate through a sheltered sea area for a short 
time, and reach her destination in Ruissalo. The distance navigated is around 8 km. The passenger 
capacity in this concept has not yet been defined neither, but the estimated passenger capacity is 
about 120 passengers. The operational function of the ferry is similar to that of ferry “A”. 
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3. Proposed Process for Hazard Analysis 
 
3.1 Process foundations 
 
The process of analysis, proposed in this report, is based on a safety engineering approach linked to 
the System- Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) included within the Systems-Theoretic Accident 
Modelling and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2011). STAMP is a new approach to depict and review the 
function of safety from a systemic perspective. It analyses accidents by making a review of the entire 
socio-technical system (Chatzimichailidou and Dokas, 2015). STAMP provides a systemic way to model 
safety for producing a better understanding about how accidents occur and how they can be 
prevented (Fleming et al., 2013). 
 
STAMP promotes hazard analysis that goes beyond component failures. This is supported with the 
STPA, a hazard analysis technique that identifies accident scenarios that encompass the entire 
accident process by including design errors, component interactions, and other social, organizational, 
and management factors in the analysis (Leveson, 2011). Previously, both STAMP and STPA have been 
satisfactorily applied in the analysis of safety of autonomous systems in other transportation domains 
such as the automobile and aviation industries (Chen et al. 2015; Hinchman et al. 2012; Oscarsson et 
al. 2016). 
 
The proposed process focuses on defining accidents that can occur in a specific mission and 
operational context of an autonomous vessel. It identifies and analyses hazards that can lead to 
defined accidents. The process is extended to incorporate a description of the hazards’ causal factors, 
and a comprehensive definition and review of potential actions to mitigate the risk. The process 
includes a systematic representation of safety controls and an initial definition of the safety 
management strategy. 
 
The proposed process for hazard analysis is performed based on the available knowledge, which 
consists of judgments and assumptions. The purpose is to provide a systematic and itemized initial list 
of safety controls in order to establish a consistent initial safety management strategy for further 
development in later design stages. 
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3.2 The hazard analysis process 
 
3.2.1 Step one: Definition of accidents and identification of hazards: 
 
Step one defines the types of accidents covered in the analysis. For this purpose, we define the 
concept of accident in accordance with Valdez Banda and Goerlandt (2017):  
 
Accident represents an undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss and affectations, 
including loss of human life or injury, property damage, equipment damage or environmental 
pollution, delays in the system operations and repair costs. 
 
The accident identification consists of specifying the accident types, which may cause the specified 
effects on the operational functioning of the autonomous vessel. In this initial analysis phase, the 
identification of accidents focuses on determining and describing the most critical accidents, which 
the safety controls, and the initial safety management strategy aim to prevent and/or provide a post-
accidental response to. 
 
The hazard identification focuses on the definition of those hazards, which can lead to the defined 
accidents. The aim is to detect a certain system state or set of conditions, which in a particular set of 
worst-case conditions in the operational context, lead to the defined accidents (Leveson, 2011). This 
enables the development of the initial systematic connection between the accidents and their linked 
hazards. 
 
3.2.2 Step two: Detailed hazard description and initial definition of mitigation actions:  
 
Step two elaborates detailed descriptions and effects of the hazards, providing a comprehensive 
argumentation about the relevancy of specific hazards, and a qualitative estimation of their potential 
severity and type of consequences. 
 
This step continues with the identification of potential causal factors of the hazard. This describes the 
hazard as a combination of system state and conditions that could influence the effect of the hazard 
occurrence. 
 
The second step concludes with identifying the possible hazard mitigation actions. This part is essential 
to represent the initial specifications of the safety controls, which are the core element of the initial 
safety management strategy (Leveson et al. 2009). These mitigation strategies are flexible to include 
diverse forms of mitigation actions including for example the implementation of technology, 
management procedures, reviews, and testing programs. The aim is to create an extensive and 
coherent list of mitigation actions. At this point, the actions have to be preliminary assessed to 
estimate the complexity and costs of their actual implementation. Finally, each mitigation action has 
to be categorized based on their intended mitigation control strategy. For this, the process includes 
the following four categories: 
 
i. The defined mitigation action attempts to reduce the damage if the accident occurs 
ii. The defined mitigation action attempts to reduce the likelihood that the hazard results in an 
accident. 
iii. The defined mitigation action attempts to reduce the likelihood that the hazard will occur. 
iv. The defined mitigation action attempts to completely eliminate the hazard 
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3.2.3 Step three: Definition of the safety controls:  
 
Step three focuses on defining safety controls based on the adopted mitigation actions. This task 
demands the review and prioritization of mitigations actions that will be further developed as the 
safety controls of the initial safety management strategy. The aim is to assess if the safety controls are 
objective and relevant before continuing their analysis and development into the initial safety 
management strategy of the autonomous vessel. 
 
3.2.4 Step four: Identification of unsafe control actions (UCAs) and redefinition of the 
safety controls  
 
The identification of UCAs and redefinition of the safety controls are executed by following the STPA 
analysis process. The objective is to analyse each hazard and the safety controls defined to it. The 
phases of the STPA process are: 
 
a) For each defined safety control, identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) that could lead to a 
hazardous state in the system. Hazardous states result from inadequate controls or 
enforcement of the safety control. These can occur because: 
- A control action for safety is not provided or followed 
- An unsafe control action is provided 
- A safety control is provided too early or too late 
- A safety control is stopped too soon or applied too long 
 
b) Define why and how UCAs could occur 
- Examine the elements included in the functioning of the safety control 
- Consider how the safety control could degrade over the time 
 
c) The STPA process includes a redefinition of the function of the safety control. The redefinition 
states how the safety control mitigates the identified UCAs. This provides a clear definition of 
the actual logic principle behind the functioning of the safety control. 
 
3.2.5 Step five: Representation of the initial safety management strategy 
 
The execution of step one to step four produce itemized information that is systematically connected. 
Step five focuses on representing the main components emerged from the analysis: the hazards, their 
safety controls, the safety controls logic principle, and the link to the accidents that these listed 
components aim to prevent or respond to. This step provides a detailed representation of the initial 
safety management strategy of the autonomous vessel. 
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4. Process application 
 
4.1 Expert consultation 
 
In order to apply the proposed process to analyse the hazards of the described Ferry A and B, experts 
in different industry domains were consulted. Appendix 1 describes the background and expertise 
areas for each participating expert. 
Initially, two experts (experts A and B) executed steps one and two of the process, which produced 
preliminary information for the following steps.  
A group of experts, with specialization and knowledge in fields relevant to the initial hazard mitigation 
actions recognized in steps one and two, continued the process. They executed steps three and four 
in four separate workshops. In the workshops, preliminary information was validated and analysed 
further. 
Step five was executed by one expert (expert B). Expert B compiled the information gathered in the 
process to a representation of the initial safety management strategy. Table 1 presents the tasks given 
for the experts in in process application.  
Table 1. Task descriptions for the experts  
Process 
Step 
Task 
One Define accidents and identify the hazards that can lead to them: 
• Are the defined accidents the most relevant for analysis? 
• Is the list of identified hazards complete? 
Two a) Execute STAMP preliminary hazard analysis for each hazard identified in step one 
b) Review the preliminary hazard analysis by answering the following questions: 
• Is the hazard description relevant and accurate? 
• Is the list of the causal factors sensible? 
• Are the mitigation actions relevant? 
• Is there any other mitigation action to be included? 
• Do you agree with the scales given to the cost/difficulty and the categorization of the 
mitigation control actions? 
Three Based on the mitigation actions, define which of these should be further analysed and redefined 
as safety controls. 
Four STPA implementation 
a) Define potential unsafe control actions for each safety control. Consider the following aspects: 
• The function of the safety control is not provided and/or enough 
• The provision of the safety control’s  function is wrong  
• The function of the safety control is provided at the wrong time 
• The function of the safety control is provided for too long or too short 
b) Define the potential causes of the unsafe controlled actions (UCAs) 
c) Redefine the safety control and specify how it mitigates the hazard and the defined UCAs 
Five Representation of the initial safety management strategy 
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4.2 Process application outcome 
4.2.1 Accident types and identification of hazards: step one 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accident Hazards 
1. Allision with a pier H1. Object detection sensor error 
H2. Al software failure 
H3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical failure) 
H4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
H5. Strong currents 
H6. Position reference equipment failure 
2. Collision with a moving object  
2.1 Collision with another vessel H1. Object detection sensor error 
H2. Al software failure 
H3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical fault) 
2.2 Collision with a small moving target 
(e.g. canoe, SUP-board, etc.) 
H1. Object detection sensor error 
H2. Al software failure 
H3. Technical failure (e.g. mechanical failure) 
3. Collision with a fixed object (e.g. 
buoys, beacons, etc.) 
H1. Object detection sensor error 
H2. Al software failure 
H3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical failure) 
H4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
H5. Strong currents 
H6. Position reference equipment failure 
4. Grounding H2. AI software failure 
H3. Technical failure (e.g. mechanical failure) 
H6. Position reference equipment failure 
H4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
H5. Strong currents 
5. Bottom touch H2. AI software failure 
H3. Technical failure (e.g. mechanical failure) 
H6. Position reference equipment failure 
H4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
H5. Strong currents 
6. Capsizing/ Sinking H7. Overloading of the vessel 
H8. Shifting of weights 
H9. Flooding 
7. Fire on board H10. Ignition of electrical equipment or wiring 
H11. Passenger starting a fire 
8. Man over board H12. Unintended falling overboard 
H13. Intended jumping overboard 
9. Medical emergency on board  H14. Person(s) getting injured 
H15. Person(s) medical condition 
10. Medical emergency on pier H14. Person(s) getting injured  
H15. Person(s) medical condition 
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4.2.2 Steps 2 to 4: detailed hazard description, definition of safety controls, identification 
of unsafe control actions (UCAs) and redefinition of the safety controls 
 
Hazard 1. Object detection sensor error 
Hazard H1. Object detection sensor error 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
In case of object detection sensor error, the information about objects around the vessel is 
not reliable and thus the vessel may not be able to navigate safely and avoid collisions with 
moving objects according to the rules of the road or collisions with fixed objects. 
 
This hazard may not affect the ship operation significantly in most cases, but in a more severe 
scenario, the hazard can have a negative impact on people, property, and environment. It can 
result in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property (own and others 
property) and environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of  sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the hazard 
occurrence? 
- Loss of power 
- Equipment malfunction 
- Dirt 
- Icing 
- Overheating 
- Equipment interference 
- Inappropriate maintenance 
- Incorrect sensor set and/or positioning of the sensors 
- Targets impossible to detect 
- Interference 
- Corrupted readings 
- Complete equipment failure 
Mitigation strategy  
- Sensor system redundancy and diversity 
- UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
- Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning systems 
- Thorough commissioning of equipment set  
- Appropriate and continuous maintenance program 
- Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
- Autonomous Integrity monitoring  
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
3 
3 
3/4 
3 
3 
2 
*Mitigation priority 
scale 
Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis 
(1) Safety control 
SC 1. Sensor system redundancy and diversity 
SC 2. UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
SC 3. Appropriate heating, cooling, and cleaning systems 
SC 4. Thorough commissioning of equipment set 
SC 5. Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance program 
SC 6. Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
SC 7. Autonomous Integrity monitoring 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1 Sensor system redundancy and diversity 
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UCA 1. Sensor does not function properly and there is no other sensor available  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Equipment chosen to provide the redundancy are not suitable 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of knowledge of sensors characteristics when planning the equipment set needed 
 
UCA 3. Sensor failure is not detected 
Potential causes 
- Sensor diagnosing does not cover all necessary areas  
 
UCA 4. External or common cause failure takes several equipment down at the same time 
Potential causes 
- Inappropriate system design  
- Incorrect installation 
- Incorrect usage 
- Environmental conditions  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Sensor system redundancy and diversity: 
- If one sensor fails the redundancy ensures there will be another sensor functioning 
- Equipment chosen to provide the redundancy have to be the correct ones in order to provide the user with the 
required information at all times 
SC 2 UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
 
UCA 1. There is a disturbance in the vessel’s power system and the equipment is not backed up with UPS  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the UPS 
 
UCA 2. The UPS does not work  
Potential causes 
- UPS is not charged 
- UPS is not connected correctly 
- UPS is broken 
 
UCA 3. The UPS takes too long to switch on  
Potential causes 
- Errors in UPS function 
 
UCA 4. The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide power for the equipment as long as needed or the capacity 
in terms of power and/or energy of the UPS is exceeded 
Potential causes 
- The disturbance lasts longer than was expected in the planning stage 
- Wrong type of UPS 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source): 
- If there is a disturbance in the vessel’s power system the UPS can temporarily provide power for the critical 
equipment 
- When the UPS setup is planned, installed and maintained properly, the user can count on a reliable backup 
system 
 
SC 3 Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning systems 
 
UCA 1. Equipment is not able to function properly in winter conditions  
Potential causes 
- Equipment does not have heating function 
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- Extremely low temperatures 
- Icing 
 
UCA 2. Equipment is not able to function properly due to high temperatures 
Potential causes 
- Equipment does not have cooling function 
- Extremely high temperatures 
- The systems are located close to heat sources 
 
UCA 3. Equipment lens is dirty 
Potential causes 
- Sea water spray 
- Bird feces 
 
UCA 4. Condensation inside equipment 
Potential causes 
- Leakage  
- Temperature changes 
- Fault on the equipment design 
- Humid climate 
- Location on-board 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning systems: 
- By applying sensors with proper heating and/or cooling systems it can be ensured that they function properly 
in all operating conditions 
- By applying sensors with automatic cleaning systems it can be ensured that they function properly outdoors  
 
SC 4 Thorough commissioning of equipment set 
  
UCA 1. The equipment set has not been properly tested or not tested at all before operation 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Test plan is not appropriate  
- Lack of time 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Thorough commissioning of equipment set: 
- When the equipment set is thoroughly tested and certified (preferably by an independent body) it ensures that 
the equipment function properly, are compatible and the operation can be run safely. 
SC 5 Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance program 
 
UCA 1. There is no on board maintenance program 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the maintenance program 
 
UCA 2. The maintenance program does not cover the necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware. 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence 
 
UCA 3. The maintenance program is not followed 
Potential causes 
- Lack of time (work overload) 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the maintenance program 
 
UCA 4.  Maintenance is not done properly 
Potential causes 
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- Lack of commitment 
- Lack of competence 
- Human error or mistake 
- Lack of economic resources  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate and continuous maintenance program: 
- By implementing an on board maintenance program it can be ensured that all critical systems remain functional 
at all times 
- A well planned maintenance program covers all necessary areas on board and it is adjusted separately for each 
vessel 
- Maintenance done timely and accordingly to the program by competent personnel ensures smooth operation 
of the sensors 
SC 6. Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
 
UCA 1. There is no continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
Potential Causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- It cannot be performed due to the effects on operation 
 
UCA 2. The continuous system diagnosis and proof testing do not cover all necessary functions 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- Tests cannot be performed due to the effects on operation  
 
UCA 3. The test is not able to recognize problems 
Potential causes 
- Wrong test design  
- Changes in the system 
 
Redefining of the safety control: 
Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing: 
- Continuous system diagnosis and regular proof testing ensure that the system functions as it should 
- Test design should be planned carefully and updated after changes in the system in order to cover all the 
necessary functions and recognize potential problems 
- Possible effect on the operation should be taken into account in planning 
SC 7. Autonomous Integrity monitoring 
 
UCA 1.  There is no integrity monitoring 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- Lack of understanding  
 
UCA 2. Integrity monitoring gives wrong information 
Potential Causes 
- Common cause failure 
- Wrong design  
- Changes in the system 
 
Redefining of the safety control: 
Autonomous Integrity monitoring: 
- Well designed and up to date integrity monitoring systems ensure that the data used has not been damaged or 
manipulated  
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Hazard 2. Al software failure 
Hazard H2. AI software failure 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
In case of an AI software failure a vessel may not be able to navigate safely or follow the 
rules of the road. AI failure may lead to collision, allision, grounding or bottom touching.  
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property, and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property (own and other people’s 
property) and environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea 
areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Architecture design failure 
- Coding error in algorithm/algorithms 
- Error in algorithm specifications 
- Situation unknown to AI 
- Loss of power 
- Overheating 
- Inappropriate maintenance 
- Software update 
- Error in learning data 
- Misleading safety function requirement 
- Changes in the system 
- Computer failure 
Mitigation strategy  
- Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of 
AI software 
- Computer and software redundancy 
- UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
- Appropriate cooling for computers 
- Appropriate and continuous on board 
maintenance programs 
- Robust system design 
- Appropriate system (software) design and 
maintenance  processes 
 
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
 
High 
High 
 
 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
 
3 
3 
3 
3 
 
4 
3 
 
 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety control 
SC 1. Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI software 
SC 2. Computer and software redundancy 
SC 3. UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
SC 4. Appropriate cooling for computers 
SC 5. Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance programs 
SC 6. Robust system design 
SC 7. Appropriate system (software) design and maintenance  processes 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1 Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI software 
 
UCA 1. Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI are not done 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
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- Lack of competence 
 
UCA 2. Insufficient planning, testing and commissioning of AI  
Potential causes 
- Poor knowledge of operational conditions 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of competence 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI: 
- Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI software ensure that the software is robust and free of 
errors 
- Applicable standards should be followed 
SC 2 Computer and software redundancy 
 
UCA 1. Computer breaks down and there is no computer and software redundancy 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of space 
- Poor design of the system 
 
UCA 2. Secondary computer does not take over in case of a failure 
Potential causes 
- Signalling error 
- No physical connection between computers 
- Malfunction of the secondary computer 
- Primary computer does not successfully pass the information to the secondary computer to take over  
- No physical connection between computers 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Computer and software redundancy: 
- Computer and software redundancy ensure availability of the AI functions at all times  
SC 3 UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
 
UCA 1. There is a disturbance in the vessel’s power system and the AI system is not backed up with UPS  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the UPS 
 
UCA 2. The UPS does not work  
Potential causes 
- UPS is not charged 
- UPS is not connected correctly 
- UPS is broken 
 
UCA 3. The UPS takes too long to switch on  
Potential causes 
- Errors in UPS function 
 
UCA 4. The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide power for the AI system as long as needed or the capacity 
in terms of power and/or energy of the UPS is exceeded 
Potential causes 
- The disturbance lasts longer than expected in the planning stage 
- Wrong type of UPS 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source): 
- If there is a disturbance in the vessel power system the UPS can temporarily provide power for the critical 
equipment 
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- When the UPS-setup is planned, installed and maintained properly, the user can count on a reliable backup 
system 
SC 4 Appropriate cooling for computers 
  
UCA 1. Computer does not function reliably due to overheating.  
Potential causes 
- The cooling is not adequate 
- The cooling is broken 
- Wrong location of the computer (limited space and inappropriate conditions) 
- Loss of power 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate cooling for computers: 
- In order to function properly all computer components must be kept within permissible operating temperature 
limits  
- Cooling systems should be selected carefully. Both the waste heat produced by the computer components and 
possible external heat sources should be taken in to account. 
SC 5 Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance programs  
 
UCA 1. There is no on board maintenance program 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the maintenance program 
 
UCA 2. The maintenance program does not cover the necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware. 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence 
 
UCA 3. The maintenance program is not followed 
Potential causes 
- Lack of time (work overload) 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the maintenance program 
 
UCA 4. Maintenance is not done properly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of commitment 
- Lack of competence 
- Human error or mistake 
- Lack of economic resources  
 
UCA 5. Software updates are not done and the system is not capable to correct detected issues 
Potential causes 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of commitment 
- Lack of competence 
- Human error or mistake 
 
UCA 6. Software update creates an inappropriate function in the system 
Potential causes 
- Wrong settings in the software for the update 
- Errors in the update 
- Changes in the interface of the equipment or software modules  
 
UCA 7. Software and hardware do not match 
Potential causes 
- Configuration management issues 
- Interrupted update process 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
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Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance programs: 
- By implementing an on board maintenance program it can be ensured that all critical systems remain functional 
at all times 
- A well planned maintenance program covers all necessary areas on board and it is adjusted separately for each 
vessel 
- Maintenance done timely and accordingly to the program by competent personnel ensures smooth operation 
-  Special attention should be paid not only to the properly timed software updates but also to the updating 
process. 
SC 6. Robust system design 
 
UCA 1. Without robust system design it is not possible to detect and cope with poor and/or missing data 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of commitment 
- Lack of competence 
- Failure modes are not taken into account 
 
UCA 2. Single point failure takes the whole system down 
Potential causes 
- Lack of system understanding 
- Failure modes are not taken into account 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Robust system design: 
- Robust system design should be able to isolate failures in the system and allow for the rest of the system to 
continue operating.  
SC 7. Appropriate system (software) design and maintenance  processes 
 
UCA 1. User requirements are not known or taken into account and the final product is not the expected. 
Potential causes 
- Poor communication between customer and developer 
- Customer is not competent to define needs 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of interest 
 
UCA 2. System requirements are not clear for the developers and do not cover relevant issues  
Potential causes 
- Poor documentation 
- Poor communication between developers and sales people 
 
UCA 3. System design does not meet expectations 
Potential causes 
- Poor documentation 
- Poor communication 
- The design is not reviewed 
 
UCA 4. System implementation does not meet expectations 
Potential causes 
- Poor documentation  
- Missing review of the implementation 
- Human coding error 
- Poor or missing testing  
 
UCA 5. Software is not verified properly 
Potential causes 
- Customer and system requirements cannot be compared due to poor documentation 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 6. Change management is not working properly 
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Potential causes 
- Change requirements are not communicated properly  
- Effect analysis of changes is not performed 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate system (software) design and maintenance  processes: 
- Ensure that the system meets customer’s expectations 
- Requires good communication between customer, sales people and developers, but also good documentation 
- Special attention should be paid to reviews throughout the process and software verification at the end 
- Change management must not be forgotten 
 
Hazard 3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical failure) 
Hazard H3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical failure)  
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
In case of technical fault, the vessel may e.g. lose her steering or propulsion power that 
may lead to collision with a moving or fixed object, allision with a pier, grounding or bottom 
contact. 
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) 
and environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Inappropriate maintenance   
- Manufacturing defect 
- Incorrect technical design 
- Vandalism 
Mitigation strategy  
- Redundancy of critical systems 
- Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of 
all technical systems 
- Appropriate and continuous maintenance 
programs 
- Distance monitoring and fault detection of the 
technical systems 
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety controls 
SC 1. Redundancy of critical systems 
SC 2. Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of all technical systems 
SC 3. Planned and predictive maintenance programs 
SC 4. Remote monitoring and fault detection of technical systems 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety controls 
SC 1. Redundancy of critical systems 
 
UCA 1. There is no redundancy for critical systems and any single failure can cause vessel operation to stop 
Potential causes 
- Lack of resources 
- Lack of competence 
- Poor planning 
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UCA 2. The critical equipment have not been identified correctly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of resources 
- Lack of competence 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 3. Critical systems have been changed without proper analysis of the effects on the system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of change management 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of competence 
- Lack of spare parts available 
- Poor documentation 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Redundancy of critical systems: 
- With redundancy in the systems the effect of a single failure can be minimized 
- Redundancy and system integration should be taken into account already in the planning stage  
- Proper testing and commissioning of the systems verifies that all critical systems have been identified 
- Changes in the system should be managed with a proper protocol/ process  
SC 2. Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of all technical systems 
 
UCA 1. Autonomous operations have not been taken into account in the whole system design   
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of knowledge and experience 
- Lack of system integration  
 
UCA 2. The tests fail to recognize the problem or potential fault in the systems 
Potential causes 
- Lack of knowledge of operational conditions 
- Only subsystems have been tested 
 
UCA 3. The commissioning is not done thoroughly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of supervision on client’s side 
- Lack of knowledge and experience 
- Poor documentation 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of all technical systems: 
- The process should be done in good cooperation with designers, buyers, builders, suppliers and regulators. The 
autonomous status of the vessel should be taken into account throughout the process 
- New and efficient practices for commissioning and testing of autonomous vessel systems should be developed 
in cooperation with the relevant stakeholders 
SC 3. Planned and predictive maintenance programs 
 
UCA 1. The system fails due to the lack of maintenance  
Potential causes 
- There is no maintenance program 
- The maintenance program is not followed 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. The maintenance done is not of the right type or it is done poorly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of knowledge about the system 
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- Lack of commitment 
 
UCA 3. Maintenance programs fail to take into account interaction between systems 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of knowledge about the system connections 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Planned and predictive maintenance programs: 
- With proper maintenance programs the safety of the vessel can be ensured, the number of technical faults 
minimized and the life cycle of technical systems maximized 
- Maintenance programs have to take into account the system interactions  
SC 4. Distance monitoring and fault detection of technical systems  
 
UCA 1. Without distance monitoring and fault detection technical faults will not be detected  
Potential causes 
- Lack of money 
- Lack of trust on distance operations 
 
UCA 2. Distance monitoring and/or fault detection of technical systems do not work 
Potential causes 
- Electromagnetic noise 
- Poor quality of the data 
- Quality of the data is not monitored 
- Failure in the data link on-board and/or ashore 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Distance monitoring and fault detection of technical systems: 
- The safe and effective operation of an autonomous vessel requires distance monitoring and fault detection. 
Remote monitoring increases the reliability of the operation and reduces off hire time 
- Without proper monitoring of the data quality, distant monitoring and fault detection systems cannot produce 
reliable information  
 
Hazard 4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
Hazard H4. Heavy weather/sea conditions 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
If the weather or sea conditions caused by wind, gusts, waves, swell, thunder or weather 
fronts are too heavy for the vessel she may come to the limits of her ability to manoeuvre 
and steer in a controlled way. This may lead to collision with a fixed object, allision with a 
pier, grounding or bottom contact.  
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) and 
environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Unexpected change of conditions 
- Lack of operational limits or incorrect operational limits 
- Weather and sea conditions have not been monitored properly 
- Local conditions differ from the surrounding areas 
- Inaccurate weather forecasts 
- Ice conditions 
Mitigation strategy  
- Correctly set and followed operational limits  
- Weather routing and constant weather and sea 
state monitoring 
- Vessels equipped with adequate environmental 
sensors for detecting local conditions 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
 
 
Medium 
 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
 
 
3 
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- Keeping vessels steady against the wind and 
waves or heading to an emergency harbour or 
anchorage 
- Constant monitoring and predictions of vessels’ 
capability 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
 
Medium 
3 
 
2 
 
 
2 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
Hazard 5. Strong currents 
Hazard H5. Strong currents 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Strong currents affect vessels’ steering, especially when manoeuvring with slow speed. 
This may lead to allision with a pier or collision with a fixed object. In some cases it may 
also lead to grounding or bottom contact.  
 
The hazard can have negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) and 
environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Lack of knowledge of local currents in rivers and archipelagos 
- Lack of monitoring the current effecting the vessel and taking it into account 
Mitigation strategy  
- Knowledge of local currents 
- Constant monitoring of the current and adjusting 
the steering accordingly 
- Constant monitoring and predictions of vessels’ 
capability 
 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Priority (1-4) * 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis (combines hazards 4 and 5): 
(1) Safety controls 
SC 1. Correctly set and followed operational limits  
SC 2. Weather routing and constant weather and sea state monitoring 
SC 3. Vessel equipped with adequate environmental sensors for detecting local conditions 
SC 4. Keeping the vessel steady against the wind and waves or heading to an emergency harbour or anchorage 
SC 5. Knowledge of local currents and other local environmental conditions 
SC 6. Constant monitoring of the currents and adjusting the steering accordingly 
SC 7. Constant monitoring and predictions of vessels capability 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety controls 
SC 1. Correctly set and followed operational limits 
 
UCA 1. Shipping company has not set operational limits for the vessel  
Potential causes 
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- Lack of competence
- Lack of understanding the importance of setting the operational limits
- Lack of control measures for ensuring that the limits are programmed to the system
UCA 2. Operational limits set by the shipping company are too high for the safe operation of the vessel 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence
- Lack of information about vessel’s features
- Pressure from outside the shipping company
- Lack of external verification
- Company takes intended risk
UCA 3. Operational limits set for the vessel are not followed 
Potential causes 
- Error in detecting the conditions affecting vessel
- Error in algorithms
- Pressure from outside the shipping company
- Lack of monitoring from the remote monitoring centre
Redefining of the safety control 
Correctly set and followed operational limits: 
- Permanent operational limits set by the shipping company and acknowledged by all the parties involved, ensure
that the operations are stopped before the safety of a vessel is compromised
- Correct operational limits can be determined by considering vessels’ features, capability to manoeuvre and
operating areas
- If limits and automatic procedures - for cases when limits are crossed - are programmed in the vessel systems, 
the limits are followed without the need to make decisions case by case. Thus decision making is not exposed
to human error
- Sending an alarm to the remote monitoring centre - when limits are crossed – acts as a double check, ensuring
that the vessel has time to cease her operations safely
SC 2. Weather routing and constant weather and sea state monitoring 
UCA 1. Environmental conditions are not taken into account when planning vessels’ routes 
- Lack of competence
- Lack of information about the conditions affecting vessels en route
UCA 2. Weather and sea state are not constantly monitored when the vessel is in operation 
- Lack of economic resources
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the environmental information
- Lack of equipment
- Information is not received from local environmental sensors or the information is not correct
UCA 3. Vessel’s route is not changed accordingly when environmental conditions require doing so 
- Error in detecting the conditions affecting the vessel
- Error in algorithms
- Lack of monitoring
- Used weather forecasts used are not reliable
Redefining of the safety control 
Weather routing and constant weather and sea state monitoring: 
- Checking the weather forecasts should always be part of the route planning. Checking the forecast automatically
against the plan (also in the permanent routes between two points) every time before departure ensures vessel
safety
- Constant automatic monitoring of the weather forecasts as well as the local real-time weather data during the
trip ensure the safety along the whole way. Receiving weather forecast from more than one source gives
redundancy and allows comparison
- With pre-planned alternative routes programmed to the system, vessels can automatically be safely re-routed
if necessary. Re-routing functions should always be properly tested in the commissioning stage.
SC 3. Vessels equipped with adequate environmental sensors for detecting local conditions 
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UCA 1. Vessels are not equipped with adequate and appropriate sensors for monitoring the conditions around them 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of knowledge of sensor characteristics or of understanding the needs when planning the sensor set for 
vessels 
- The sensors chosen are not planned to be used in cold climates 
- Lack of guidance (regulations) 
 
UCA 2. There is not enough redundancy in environmental sensors 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of competence 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessels equipped with adequate environmental sensors for detecting local conditions: 
- With proper equipment on board (or along the route), vessels are able to react also to sudden local changes in 
the conditions  
- In winter conditions proper and reliable operation can be guaranteed if local needs and equipment 
characteristics as well as redundancy needs, are considered carefully already when planning the vessel.  
SC 4. Keeping the vessel steady against the wind and waves, heading to an emergency harbour or anchoring   
  
UCA 1. In case the weather/sea conditions change suddenly over the operational limits, the vessel continues on her 
route normally instead of choosing a safer option for the situation 
Potential causes 
- There are no emergency harbours programmed in the system 
- Lack of monitoring the environmental conditions 
- Lack of monitoring from the remote monitoring centre 
- It is safer to continue 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Keeping the vessel steady against the wind and waves, heading to an emergency harbour or anchoring : 
- If an unexpected weather change makes continuing on the route unsafe, automatic route specific contingency 
actions (such as driving with minimum manoeuvring speed against the wind etc. or re-routing the vessel to a 
suitable emergency harbour) programmed to the system are necessary precautions 
SC 5. Knowledge of local currents and other local environmental conditions 
 
UCA 1. Information about local currents and local environmental conditions in rivers and archipelagos have not been 
gathered 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence 
- Lack of existing information or up to date information 
- Lack of commitment 
 
UCA 2. Information about local currents and local environmental conditions have not been taken into account when 
planning vessel routes 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence 
- Lack of commitment 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Knowledge of local currents and other local environmental conditions: 
- Available information about the local currents and frequent weather conditions is a valuable tool when planning 
the vessel and her routes. Especially in archipelagos, lakes and rivers there can be strong local currents, places 
where fog regularly forms or where the wave height rises above the normal level  
SC 6. Constant monitoring of the current and adjusting the steering accordingly 
 
UCA 1. There is no equipment available to monitor the current in real time 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of suitable equipment in the market 
- There is no actual need to measure the current 
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UCA 2. Current monitoring system does not function correctly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of maintenance 
- Error in equipment 
 
UCA 3.Current monitoring information is not connected to the AI and steering equipment 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 4. The reaction time to drifting is too long  
Potential causes 
- Error in programming 
- Lack of competence 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Constant monitoring of the current and adjusting the steering accordingly: 
- Vessels reliably equipped to monitor real time currents and to automatically adjust the steering accordingly, 
without delays, are able to manoeuvre and dock safely and smoothly 
SC 7. Constant monitoring and predictions of vessel capability 
 
UCA 1. Vessel capability is not monitored 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of competence 
- Lack of commitment 
 
UCA 2. Information of the vessel capability is not used to adjust the operational limits or the operation 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of competence 
- Lack of commitment 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Constant monitoring and predictions of vessel capability: 
- With constant monitoring and predictions of vessel capability, vessels are able to adjust operational limits and  
operation in general when necessary. There might be external or internal factors that require lowering the 
operational limits temporarily 
 
Hazard 6. Position reference equipment failure  
Hazard H6. Position reference equipment failure 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
If the position reference equipment fail or give incorrect information, vessels cannot 
navigate safely. This may lead to allision with pier or collision with a fixed object, grounding 
or bottom touching.  
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property, and environment. It can result 
in injuries, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) and 
environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Loss of power 
- Intentional satellite position system jamming 
- Unintentional satellite positioning jamming 
- Satellite position system spoofing 
- Poor satellite availability 
- Effect of rain etc. on local position reference systems 
- Dirt (on local position system sensor) 
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- Equipment malfunction  
- Inappropriate maintenance 
Mitigation strategy  
- Equipment (sensor) redundancy 
- Combination of local and satellite position 
reference systems 
- Satellite positioning equipment with  jamming 
detection and/or anti-jamming function 
- UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
- Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning for 
local position reference systems 
- Thorough installation and commissioning of 
equipment set  
- Appropriate and continuous on board 
maintenance programs 
- Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
- Autonomous integrity monitoring 
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
High 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
3 
 
3/4 
 
3 
 
3 
2 
*Mitigation priority 
scale 
Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an 
accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(3) Safety control 
SC 1. Equipment (sensor) redundancy 
SC 2. Combination of local and satellite position reference systems 
SC 3. Satellite positioning equipment with  jamming detection and/or anti-jamming function 
SC 4. UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
SC 5. Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning for local position reference systems 
SC 6. Thorough installation and commissioning of equipment set 
SC 7. Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance program 
SC 8. Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
SC 9. Autonomous Integrity monitoring 
(4) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1 Equipment (sensor) redundancy 
 
UCA 1. Sensor does not function properly and there is no redundancy in the system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. Sensor failure is not detected due to the lack of information from other equipment to be compared with 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 3. External or common cause failures take several equipment down at the same time 
Potential causes 
- Inappropriate system design 
- Incorrect installation 
- Incorrect usage 
- Environmental conditions 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
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Equipment (sensor) redundancy 
- If one sensor fails the redundancy ensures there is another sensor functioning 
- System design must have adequate diagnosis function in order to recognize sensor failures and perform the 
switch over procedure when necessary 
- Equipment used to provide redundancy should be completely independent from one another to reduce the risk 
of a common cause failure taking them down at the same time 
SC 2 Combination of  local and satellite position reference systems 
 
UCA 1. Positioning is based on satellite positioning only and vessels e.g. lose position because of satellite system 
failures or poor satellite availability 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Inappropriate system design  
 
UCA 2. Satellite positioning reference equipment give incorrect information and there is no local positioning 
information to compare it with 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Inappropriate system design  
 
UCA 3. Positioning is based on local position reference systems only and vessels e.g. lose position due to poor 
weather conditions 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Inappropriate system design  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Combining different types of local and satellite position reference systems: 
- Using a combination of local and satellite position reference systems provides reliable position information in 
different conditions and locations 
- Helps to detect possible errors in the information 
SC 3. Satellite positioning equipment with  jamming detection and/or anti-jamming function 
 
UCA 1. Vessel loses her position due to jamming 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of certified equipment in the market 
 
UCA 2. Vessel receives wrong or inaccurate position information due to jamming 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of certified equipment in the market 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Satellite positioning equipment with  jamming detection and/or anti-jamming function 
- Jamming detection ensures that the jamming is noticed and users can switch to local position reference systems 
- An anti-jamming function reduces the risk of losing position or receiving wrong/inaccurate position information 
due to GPS jamming 
SC 4 UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source) 
 
UCA 1. There is a disturbance in a vessel’s power system and the equipment is not backed up with UPS  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the UPS 
 
UCA 2. The UPS does not work  
Potential causes 
- UPS is not charged 
- UPS is not connected correctly 
- UPS is broken 
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UCA 3. It takes too long for the UPS to switch on and the GPS equipment needs to reacquire the position fix  
Potential causes 
- Errors in UPS function 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 4. The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide power for the equipment as long as needed or the capacity 
in terms of power and/or energy of the UPS is exceeded 
Potential causes 
- The disturbance lasts longer than expected in the planning stage 
- Wrong type of UPS 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
UPS (Uninterrupted Power Source): 
- If there is a disturbance in the vessel power system, the UPS can temporarily provide power for critical 
equipment 
- When the UPS setup is planned, installed and maintained properly, the user can count on a reliable backup 
system 
- For the GPS system a UPS with a quick switch-on function is critical. In case of power loss, the GPS equipment 
needs to reacquire the position fix, something which can take several minutes at worst. 
SC 5 Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning for local position reference systems 
UCA 1. Equipment is not able to function properly in winter conditions  
Potential causes 
- Equipment does not have heating function 
- Extremely low temperatures 
- Icing 
 
UCA 2. Equipment does not function properly due to high temperatures 
Potential causes 
- Equipment does not have cooling function 
- Extremely high temperatures 
- The systems are located close to heat sources 
 
UCA 3. Equipment lens is dirty 
Potential causes 
- Sea water sprays 
- Bird feces 
 
UCA 4. Condensation inside equipment 
Potential causes 
- Leaking  
- Temperature changes 
- Fault on the equipment design 
- Humid climate 
- Location on-board 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate heating, cooling and cleaning systems: 
- By applying sensors with proper heating and/or cooling systems it is ensured that they function properly in all 
operating conditions 
- By applying sensors with automatic cleaning systems it is ensured that they function properly outdoors  
SC 6 Thorough installation and commissioning of equipment set 
  
UCA 1. Position of the GPS antenna has a limited sky view  
Potential causes 
- Limited space 
- Poor planning 
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UCA 2. GPS antenna is placed too close to radio equipment causing interference 
Potential causes 
- Limited space 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 3. GPS antenna cable length and amplification are not optimized 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 4. Local position reference system’s sensor head or antenna view is blocked by obstacles 
Potential causes 
- Limited space 
- Poor planning 
- Poor change management 
 
UCA 5. The equipment set has not been properly tested, or not tested at all, before operation 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Test plan is not appropriate  
- Lack of time 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Thorough installation and commissioning of equipment set: 
- Placing of the GPS antenna has to be optimal with regards to the sky view and distance to transmitting radio 
equipment 
- Installation of the GPS antenna and cabling have to be thoroughly planned and performed by a certified supplier 
- An unobstructed sensor head and antenna view is essential when using local position reference systems 
- When the equipment set is thoroughly tested and certified (preferably by an independent body) it ensures that 
the equipment function properly, are compatible and the operation can be run safely. 
SC 7 Appropriate and continuous on board maintenance program 
 
UCA 1. There is no on board maintenance program 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding the importance of maintenance programs 
 
UCA 2. The maintenance program does not cover the necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware. 
Potential causes 
- Lack of competence 
 
UCA 3. The maintenance program is not followed 
Potential causes 
- Lack of time (work overload) 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of understanding of the importance of the maintenance program 
 
UCA 4.  Maintenance is not done properly 
Potential causes 
- Lack of commitment 
- Lack of competence 
- Human error or mistake 
- Lack of economic resources  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate and continuous maintenance program: 
- By implementing an on board maintenance program it can be ensured that all critical systems remain functional 
at all times 
- A well planned maintenance program covers all necessary areas on board and it is adjusted separately for each 
vessel 
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- Maintenance done timely and accordingly to the program by competent personnel ensures the smooth 
operation of the sensors 
SC 8. Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
 
UCA 1. There is no continuous system diagnosis and proof testing 
Potential Causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- It cannot be performed due to the effects on operation 
 
UCA 2. The continuous system diagnosis and proof testing do not cover all necessary functions 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- Tests cannot be performed due to the effects on operation  
 
UCA 3. The test is not able to recognize problems 
Potential causes 
- Wrong test design  
- Changes in the system 
 
Redefining of the safety control: 
Continuous system diagnosis and proof testing: 
- Continuous system diagnosis and regular proof testing ensures that the system functions as it should 
- Test design should be planned carefully and updated after changes in the system in order to cover all the 
necessary functions and recognize potential problems 
- Possible effect on the operation should be taken into account in the planning 
SC 9. Autonomous Integrity monitoring 
UCA 1.  There is no integrity monitoring 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of planning 
- Lack of understanding  
 
UCA 2. Integrity monitoring gives wrong information 
Potential Causes 
- Common cause failure 
- Wrong design  
- Changes in the system 
 
UCA 3. Integrity monitoring is not able to recognize spoofing signals 
Potential Causes 
- Lack of competence 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of certified equipment in the market 
 
Redefining of the safety control: 
Autonomous Integrity monitoring: 
- Well designed and up to date integrity monitoring systems ensure that the data has not been damaged or 
manipulated  
 
Hazard 7. Overloading vessels 
Hazard H7. Overloading vessels 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Overloading a vessel causes stability problems and affects her manoeuvring 
characteristics. It may lead to capsizing or sinking of the vessel.  
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The hazard can have negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property and environmental effects 
such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Too many passengers 
- Too much cargo 
- Added permanent weights like equipment etc. 
Mitigation strategy  
- Automated door type passenger gates  which do 
not allow more than maximum number of 
passengers on board 
- Clear rules, weighing and monitoring of the cargo 
taken on board 
- In case of adding permanent weights on board 
stability calculations and tests to be redone 
- Automatic continuous monitoring of vessel 
stability (draft, trim, list and GM), vessels 
programmed not to leave pier if over the limits. 
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1)Safety controls 
SC 1. Automated door type passenger gates  which do not allow more than maximum number of passengers on board 
SC 2. Clear rules, weighing and monitoring of the cargo taken on board 
SC 3. In case of adding permanent weights on board stability calculations and tests to be redone 
SC 4. Automatic continuous monitoring of the vessel’s stability (draft, trim, list and GM), vessel programmed not to 
leave pier if over the limits. 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety controls 
SC 1. Automated passenger gates  which do not allow more than maximum number of passengers on board 
 
UCA 1. There is no system to count the number of the passengers on board  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of technology 
- Lack of planning 
 
UCA 2. There is a system but it is not reliable 
Potential causes 
- Passengers stay on-board for a second trip 
- Unaccounted persons (people without ticket, wheelchair users, family with children, bikes, baby strollers) who 
come on board via another route 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of technology 
- Lack of planning 
- Lack of maintenance  
- Function error 
 
UCA 3. The passenger gate separates family members (parents and children) 
Potential cause 
- The vessel is full 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
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Automated passenger gates  which do not allow more than maximum number of passengers on board: 
- With reliable passenger count, the overloading of the vessel and the exceeding of maximum number of 
passengers can be avoided 
- Systems have to take into account people staying on-board, people without ticket, wheelchairs, families with 
children, bikes, baby strollers etc. that do not board the vessel through the gates. The gate should not separate 
parents and children 
- The possible solutions for counting reliably could be e.g. automatic software and camera systems that compare 
the amount of passengers going in and out, defining a boarding process and boarding areas in pier, or emptying 
the vessel completely before reloading 
SC 2. Clear rules, weighing and monitoring of the cargo taken on board 
 
UCA 1. Vessels are overloaded because there is no knowledge of weight of cargo on board 
Potential causes 
- There is no system in place to monitor weights  
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of commitment 
 
UCA 2. There is a system for weighing the cargo but it is not reliable 
Potential causes 
- Calibration is not done 
- Lack of maintenance 
- Error in the system 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Clear rules, weighing and monitoring of the cargo taken on board: 
- By monitoring the vessel trim, list and draft, weight of the vessel can be calculated 
- The possible means that can be used are e.g. pressure sensors, echo sounder or visual reading of drafts 
SC 3. In case of adding permanent weights on board stability calculations and tests to be redone 
 
UCA 1. The added weights are not recorded 
Potential causes 
- Lack of oversight 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
 
UCA 2. The recorded weights are inaccurate  
Potential causes 
- Lack of information 
- Lack of knowledge 
- Lack of commitment  
- Lack of oversight 
 
UCA 3. The stability tests/calculations are not updated 
Potential causes 
- Lack of information 
- Lack of knowledge 
- Lack of commitment  
- Lack of oversight 
- Lack economic resources 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
In case of adding permanent weights on board stability calculations and tests to be redone 
- If stability calculations are not up to date, the vessel operation may not be safe and according to regulations 
SC 4. Automatic continuous monitoring of vessel stability (draft, trim, list and GM), vessel programmed not to leave pier 
if over the limits 
 
UCA 1. There is no system to continuously monitor vessel stability  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
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- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of oversight 
 
UCA 2. Vessel does not leave pier even though the vessel is loaded correctly  or leaves the pier overloaded 
Potential causes 
- Equipment malfunction (inaccuracy) 
- Lack of redundancy 
 
UCA 3. There is only one monitoring system with no redundancy 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Automatic continuous monitoring of the vessel’s stability (draft, trim, list and GM), vessel programmed not to leave 
the pier if over the limits 
- There should always be real-time information available of the vessel’s stability in order to operate safely. By 
programming the safety limits allowed to the system, leaving pier can be prevented in unsafe stability situations 
- With redundant monitoring systems, unnecessary stops in operation or unsafe situations caused by an 
equipment malfunction can be minimized 
 
Hazard 8. Shifting of weights 
Hazard H8. Shifting of weights 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Shifting of weights on board affect vessel stability dramatically, especially if the weights 
are shifted to upper levels of the vessel or the shifting weights create free surfaces. This 
hazard may lead to capsizing or sinking of vessels.  
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property and environmental effects 
such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- All passengers moving to one side 
- Cargo starts moving 
- Water from fire fighting create free surfaces 
- Poor planning 
Mitigation strategy  
- Passenger instructions on quay and on board 
- Vessel design 
- Firefighting systems that use very little water or 
no water at all 
- Anti-heeling system 
- Remote monitoring centre monitors vessels 
stability and instructs people by voice if 
necessary 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
Medium 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
Priority (1-4) * 
3 
4 
4 
 
4 
 
2 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
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STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety controls 
SC 1. Passenger instructions on quay and on board 
SC 2. Vessel design 
SC 3. Firefighting systems that use very little water or no water at all 
SC 4. Anti-heeling system 
SC 5. Remote monitoring centres monitor vessel stability and instructs people by voice if necessary 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety controls 
SC 1. Passenger instructions on quay and on board 
 
UCA 1. Passenger instructions regarding weight distribution are poor or not easy enough to understand 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the instructions 
Potential causes 
- Positioning of the instructions 
- Visual look of the instructions 
- Language barrier 
- Time constraint 
- Wrong means for providing instructions 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Passenger instructions on quay and on board: 
- Good passenger information is clear, simple and does not leave place for misunderstandings 
- If the information is visually interesting and the means for giving it are correct, people are more likely to read, 
listen or watch it  
SC 2. Vessel design 
UCA 1. The design does not prevent the people from crowding or falling to one side of the vessel 
Potential causes 
- Poor interior design 
- Lack of seating 
- Lack of natural dividers 
 
UCA 2. The vessel lists considerably in case of the crowding of people to one side 
Potential causes 
- Poor initial stability 
 
UCA 3. Cargo and storage spaces do not have any compartments that would prevent items from moving to one side 
of the vessel  
Potential causes 
- Poor design 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessel design: 
- With good vessel design, passenger and cargo movements and stability can be controlled. E.g. seating 
arrangements can be used as natural dividers and the vessel can be designed with very high initial stability. 
SC 3. Firefighting systems that use very little water or no water at all  
 
UCA 1. The use of large amount of firefighting water creates free surfaces and may endanger the vessel stability 
Potential causes 
- Poor design 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Wrong type of firefighting system 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Firefighting systems that use very little water or no water at all: 
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- When selecting the firefighting system to be installed on board, the stability and the free surface effects caused 
by the firefighting water should be taken into account 
SC 4. Anti-heeling system 
 
UCA 1. Vessels have no anti-heeling system, listing can not be corrected and causes danger or discomfort for 
passengers 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor initial ship design 
 
UCA 2. Malfunctioning of anti-heeling systems may endanger vessel safety  
Potential causes 
- Poor safety planning 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
- If the vessel is designed with anti-healing system that compensates for small heels, it increases the comfort and 
safety of the passengers. However, a possible malfunction of the system must not be able to endanger the safety 
of the vessel  
SC 5. Remote monitoring centres monitor vessel stability and instruct people by voice if necessary 
 
UCA 1. People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act irrationally, because the system for instructing people 
by voice does not exist 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessel’s safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Connection between the vessels and the monitoring centres does not work 
Potential causes 
- Technical problem 
- Lack of redundancy 
 
UCA 3. The way of giving instructions is not suitable and they are not followed onboard 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning  
- Psychological factors have not been considered deep enough in planning the messages 
- Person in charge of the situation has not been properly trained 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Remote monitoring centres monitor vessel stability and instruct people by voice if necessary: 
- Calming the passengers is necessary in order to keep them functional and prevent irrational actions that make 
the situation worse. With detailed instructions, untrained people are able to perform operations they would not 
be able to do on their own 
- Persons giving instructions have to be well trained in basic ship stability as well as crowd and crisis management 
- There has to be redundancy in the connection between vessels and shore and it has to be reliable 
 
Hazard 9. Flooding 
Hazard H9. Flooding 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Vessels taking in water may lose stability and capsize or sink very quickly.  
 
The hazard can have negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property and environmental effects 
such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Penetration of the hull 
- Fire fighting with large amounts of water 
- Large amounts of rain 
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- Heavy listing that allows water to flood the main deck from the openings 
Mitigation strategy  
- Double hull and compartments 
- Well planned and built piping systems 
- Automatic monitoring system for tanks, pipes, 
and cofferdams 
- Fire extinguishing systems that use very little 
water or no water at all 
- Good drainage system on the deck 
- Effective bilge pumps 
Cost/Difficulty  
High 
medium 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
Medium 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
4 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
2 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety controls  
SC 1. Double hull and compartments 
SC 2.  Well planned and built piping systems 
SC 3. Automatic monitoring systems for tanks, pipes and cofferdams 
SC 4. Fire extinguishing systems that use very little water or no water at all 
SC 5. Good drainage system on the deck 
SC 6. Effective bilge pumps 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety controls 
SC 1. Double hull and compartments 
 
UCA 1. Single hull allows large amounts of water to flood spaces under the waterline very quickly if penetrated 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of space 
- Weight of vessels 
 
UCA 2. Vessels lose stability due to water moving freely inside the hull 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of space 
- Weight of the vessel 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Double hull and compartments: 
- A double hull and compartmented structure help vessels maintain stability in case of an accident 
SC 2.  Well planned and built piping systems 
 
UCA 1.  Bursting of a single wall pipe allows water (or other liquids) to leak to the spaces inside the hull 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Weight of the vessel 
- Lack of space  
 
UCA 2. Rigid metal piping breaks due to vibrations or pressure shocks  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Metal piping is easy to plan 
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UCA 3. Complex piping systems with many connection points are more likely to break and leak 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Poor installation 
- Lack of knowledge from client’s side 
 
UCA 4. There are only system drawings and no production drawings and the construction worker has to make 
decisions about details 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of knowledge from client’s side 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Well planned and built piping system: 
- Using double wall pipes, correct materials for pipes and connection points depending on the needs, makes the 
piping system resistant and less likely to break 
- Good planning, building, testing, and oversight of the whole process make the piping system reliable, easy to use 
and maintain 
SC 3. Automatic monitoring systems for tanks, pipes, bilges, and cofferdams 
 
UCA 1. If autonomous vessels without automatic monitoring systems for tanks, bilges and cofferdams suffer 
accidents, vessel stability problems and possible leaks cannot be detected 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. A burst pipe in the engine room is not noticed 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Automatic monitoring system for tanks, pipes, bilges, and cofferdams: 
- Leaks and bursts in hull and piping can be detected quickly by an automatic monitoring system 
- In case of an accident, vessels stability can be evaluated and possible actions planned accordingly 
- The function of the monitoring system needs to be also monitored  
SC 4. Fire extinguishing systems that use very little water or no water at all 
 
UCA 1. Vessel loses her stability due to the large amount of water used in firefighting.   
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Wrong type of fire extinguishing system 
- Fire extinguishing system is used for too long 
- Lack of competence 
- Wrong firefighting tactics 
 
UCA 2. Firefighting water damages vessel equipment.  
Potential causes 
- Wrong type of firefighting system 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Fire extinguishing systems that use very little water or no water at all: 
- Reduce the possibility that a firewater causes stability problems to the vessel and therefore allows the system 
to be used as long as necessary 
- May damage the vessel’s equipment less compared to a situation when large amounts of water is used in 
firefighting 
- A good solution could be to use aerosol system (potassium based) for fire extinguishing and water mist system 
for cooling 
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SC 5. Good drainage system on deck 
 
UCA 1. Rainwater and sea spray flood the deck and weaken vessel stability due to lack of efficient drainage system 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Poor installation  
 
UCA 2. Drainage system is blocked by ice in winter conditions 
Potential causes 
- Extremely cold temperatures 
- No heating system 
 
UCA 3. Drainage systems are blocked by dirt or debris. 
Potential causes 
- Poor maintenance 
- Vandalism by passengers 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Good drainage systems on deck: 
- Removes water from the deck efficiently and reduces possible stability problems 
- Winter conditions and possibility of passengers sticking litter etc. into the drainage have to be taken into 
account when planning the drainage system 
SC 6. Effective bilge pumps 
 
UCA 1. Bilge pumps are not effective enough to pump out the water coming in from a penetration in the hull. 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. Bilge pumps break and there is no redundancy  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 3. The bilge pumps are not connected to the emergency power system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Poor planning 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Effective bilge pumps: 
- Keep the vessel afloat if there is water in the engine room and give time for the evacuation of the passengers 
- Protect vessel equipment and systems in case of flooding 
- Pump redundancy and emergency power systems have to be taken into account 
 
Hazard 10. Ignition of electrical equipment and wiring 
Hazard H10. Ignition of electrical equipment and wiring 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Electrical equipment and wiring are potential ignition places for fires on board 
autonomous vessels. 
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) 
and environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Inappropriate selection of electrical equipment and wiring 
- Wear and tear of wiring 
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- Loose connections 
- Overloads 
- Short circuits 
- Power surges 
- Overheating 
- Maintenance problems 
Mitigation strategy  
- Thorough planning and commissioning of 
electrical equipment and wiring 
- Appropriate cooling and heating for electrical 
systems 
- Preventive maintenance programs 
- Circuit breakers and fault current protection 
- Automatic fire extinguishing systems inside 
electrical cabinets 
- Automatic fire detection, alarm and extinguishing 
systems in engine spaces 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
Priority (1-4) * 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
4 
1 
 
 
1 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety controls 
SC 1. Thorough planning and commissioning of electrical equipment and wiring 
SC 2. Appropriate cooling and heating for electrical systems 
SC 3. Preventive maintenance programs 
SC 4. Circuit breakers and fault current protection 
SC 5. Automatic fire extinguishing systems inside electrical cabinets 
SC 6. Automatic fire detection, alarm and extinguishing systems in engine spaces 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1. Thorough planning and commissioning of electrical equipment and wiring 
 
UCA 1. Wrong equipment and wiring or their installations cause fires or cause fires to spread more rapidly than 
necessary 
Potential causes 
- Lack of knowledge 
- Lack of oversight 
 
UCA 2. Information used in the planning does not correlate with the use of the system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of information 
- Project schedule 
- Change of an operational profile 
 
UCA 3. Testing is poorly planned and done 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of time 
- Lack of knowledge 
- Lack of oversight 
- Lack of information 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Thorough planning and commissioning of electrical equipment and wiring: 
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- Ensure that components, wiring and equipment chosen are correct for the actual use of the vessel and the 
installation and penetrations are done properly 
- The testing of the electrical equipment and wiring detects the possible faults in the system 
SC 2. Appropriate cooling and heating for electrical systems 
 
UCA 1. Overheating of the equipment break the equipment or causes a fire 
Potential causes 
- No cooling system installed 
- Cooling of the surrounding space is not adequate 
- Change of environmental conditions 
- Fault in component or equipment  
 
UCA 2. Condensation causes a short circuit in electrical equipment 
Potential causes 
- No heating system installed 
- Change of environmental conditions 
- Outdoor equipment with no thermal insulation 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Appropriate cooling and heating for electrical systems 
- By providing appropriate cooling and heating for electrical systems, problems caused by overheating and 
humidity can be prevented 
SC 3. Preventive maintenance programs 
 
UCA 1. Dust in the equipment may result in overheating and ignition  
Potential causes 
- Lack of maintenance  
 
UCA 2. Loose connections may result in overheating and ignition 
Potential causes 
- Lack of maintenance 
- Vibrations 
- Poor installation 
- Wrong component type 
 
UCA 3. Malfunction of the circuit breakers or other protection components e.g. arc protection systems 
Potential causes 
- Lack of maintenance 
- Component failure  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Preventive maintenance programs:  
- By checking the cleanliness, connections and proper function of electrical equipment and wiring as well as 
protection equipment regularly, the risk of ignition of electrical equipment and wiring can be reduced. 
SC 4. Circuit breakers and fault current protection 
 
UCA 1. Circuit breaker does not open or cut off the power  
Potential causes 
- Malfunction of the circuit breaker  
- Protection relay does not give the opening order to the circuit breaker 
- Component failure 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Circuit breakers and fault current protection: 
- Circuit breakers and fault current protection protect equipment and prevent ignition of electrical equipment 
and wiring 
SC 5. Automatic fire extinguishing systems inside electrical cabinets 
 
UCA 1. Without extinguishing systems inside the cabinets, fire can spread to the surrounding spaces  
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Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Weight and space issues 
 
UCA 2. The capacity of the extinguishing system is too small to extinguish the fire  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of knowledge 
 
UCA 3. Too high capacity of the aerosol or gas extinguishing systems build up pressure and increase the fire instead 
of extinguishing it 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of knowledge 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Automatic fire extinguishing systems inside electrical cabinets: 
- Prevent spreading of the fire to the surrounding spaces and reduce damage to the equipment 
- Special attention should be paid to defining the capacity of the extinguishing system  
SC 6. Automatic fire detection, alarm and extinguishing systems in engine spaces 
 
UCA 1. Fire in the engine spaces cannot be detected 
Potential causes 
- Wrong type of detectors 
- Wrong location of detectors 
- Not enough detectors 
- Equipment malfunction 
- Poor maintenance  
 
UCA 2. Alarm systems are not connected directly to the remote monitoring centre; the information about the 
situation is not forwarded 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 3. Fire fighters may not be able to enter or extinguish the fire in the engine room 
Potential causes 
- Heat and fire gases 
- Difficulties in entering the engine spaces 
 
UCA 4. Extinguishing systems are not capable to extinguish the fire 
Potential causes 
- Lack of power 
- Malfunction 
- Lack of maintenance 
- Poor planning 
- Capacity is too small or too large 
- Wrong timing 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Automatic fire detection, alarm and extinguishing systems in engine spaces: 
- Automatic and effective fire detection and alarm systems provide the ship systems and remote operation centre 
information about the situation without delay. Detector locations, types and number of detectors should be 
planned carefully 
- Automatic extinguishing systems are the quickest and safest way to extinguish engine room fires in autonomous 
vessels. Firefighters may not be able to enter the engine spaces physically at all 
- Attention should be paid to choosing the right type of extinguishing systems and defining the right capacity for 
spaces 
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Hazard 11. Passenger starting a fire 
Hazard H11. Passenger starting a fire 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Passengers may start fires in passenger spaces by careless forbidden acts. 
 
The hazard can have a negative impact on people, property, and environment. It can result 
in injuries, loss of human life, severe damage or loss of property (own and others property) 
and environmental effects such as oil spills or other damage of sensitive sea areas. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Smoking or putting cigarette ash or stubs in trash bins 
- “Horseplay” i.e. playing with a lighter 
- Deliberate act, arson 
Mitigation strategy  
- Smoke detectors and automatic fire 
extinguishing systems in  passenger spaces 
- No smoking signs 
- Video surveillance system 
- Both automatic and manual fire alarm systems in 
passenger spaces with direct contact to remote 
monitoring centres 
- Use of inflammable and fire resistant materials in 
passenger spaces 
- Possibility for the passengers to extinguish a fire 
Cost/Difficulty  
Medium 
 
Low 
High 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
Priority (1-4) * 
2 
 
3 
2/3 
2 
 
 
3 
 
2 
*Mitigation priority 
scale 
Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis: 
(1) Safety controls 
SC 1. Smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishing systems in passenger spaces 
SC 2. No smoking signs 
SC 3. Video surveillance systems 
SC 4. Both automatic and manual fire alarm systems in the passenger spaces with direct access to remote monitoring 
centres 
SC 5. Use of inflammable and fire resistant materials in passenger spaces 
SC 6. Possibility for the passengers to extinguish fires 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1. Smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishing systems in passenger spaces 
 
UCA 1. Fire in passenger spaces is not detected 
Potential causes 
- Wrong type of detectors 
- Wrong location of the detectors 
- Not enough detectors 
- Equipment malfunction 
- Poor maintenance  
 
UCA 2. Extinguishing systems are not capable to extinguish the fire 
Potential causes 
- Lack of power 
- Malfunction 
- Lack of maintenance 
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- Poor planning 
- Capacity is too small or too large 
- Wrong timing 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Smoke detectors and automatic fire extinguishing systems in passenger spaces: 
- Smoke detectors are the most suitable device to detect fire in passenger spaces. Use of additional flame 
detectors could however also be considered. It is essential to get the information about the fire immediately. 
Delays in this information endangers the whole rescue operation   
- When choosing extinguishing systems for passenger spaces the safety of the passengers should be priority 
number one. E.g. low-pressure water mist systems with concealed nozzles would be a safe and reliable option 
in unmanned vessels. 
SC 2. No smoking signs 
 
UCA 1. Passenger smokes on board and starts a fire 
Potential causes 
- Lack of respect to the law 
- Intoxication 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
No smoking signs: 
- Smoking is one of the most likely reasons for having fire in passenger spaces. No smoking signs inform 
passengers that smoking on board is not allowed 
SC 3. Video surveillance system 
 
UCA 1. Without active video surveillance the preventive factor cannot be achieved 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Video is not streamed ashore from the vessel in real time. 
Potential causes  
- Technical problem 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 3. There is no reaction to a situation captured in the video surveillance system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of commitment 
- Work overload 
- Lack of training and/or instructions 
- Human machine interface limitations 
 
UCA 4. Video surveillance does not perform properly 
Potential causes 
- Bad planning  
- Problems in data transfer 
- Technical problems with the camera 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources  
- Power source malfunction 
- Quality of the picture affected by weather conditions 
- Different lighting conditions have not been taken into consideration 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Video surveillance system: 
- Awareness of the video surveillance system can prevent erratic passenger behaviour. With active monitoring, 
dangerous situations can be identified and intervened in real-time  
- Reliable real-time data transfer ashore is an essential part of the system if monitored manually ashore 
- Appropriate technical specifications of the system should be planned and implemented efficiently 
- The video surveillance system itself has to be efficiently monitored 
42 
 
SC 4. Both automatic and manual fire alarm systems on the passenger spaces with direct access to remote monitoring 
centres 
 
UCA 1. Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to send alarm about fire in passenger spaces 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Smoke detectors are activated but no alarm is given to the passengers 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Malfunction 
 
UCA 3. Alarm systems are not connected directly to the remote monitoring centres and information about the 
situation is not forwarded. 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Both automatic and manual fire alarm systems in the passenger spaces with direct contact to remote monitoring 
centres: 
- It is essential to get information about fires immediately to remote monitoring centres.   Delays in this 
information endanger the whole rescue operation. In some cases, passengers may notice the fire earlier than 
the automatic system and need to be able to send the alarm manually 
- Passengers need to be informed about the activated alarm 
SC 5. Use of inflammable and fire resistant materials in passenger spaces  
 
UCA 1. Flammable and non-fire resistant materials allow the fire to spread quickly  
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of knowledge 
- Priority of passenger comfort 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Use of inflammable and fire resistant materials in passenger spaces: 
- The material used in passenger spaces has significant effect in passenger safety in case of fire 
- The amount of plastic should be kept low  
SC 6. Possibility for the passengers to extinguish a fire  
 
UCA 1. Available firefighting  equipment is too complicated to be used by untrained people 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessel’s safety features 
 
UCA 2. Firefighting equipment are not properly placed, missing or not ready for use. 
Potential causes 
- Vandalism 
- Poor planning  
- Poor maintenance 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Possibility for passengers to extinguish  fires: 
- Firefighting equipment on board should be easily available, simple, safe and easy to use for untrained persons 
- Equipment should be placed so that they cannot be easily tampered, e.g. inside a cabinet with an alarm if 
opened 
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Hazard 12. Unintended falling overboard 
Hazard H12. Unintended falling overboard 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Unintended falling overboard from a vessel leads to man over board situations and salvage 
operations, which can be difficult in case of unmanned vessels and often require outside 
assistance. 
The hazard can have negative impact on people. It can result in injuries or loss of human 
life. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Children falling overboard under or between bars in open reeling structures 
- Passengers sitting on the reeling 
- Passengers reaching over the reeling 
- Open embarkation/disembarkation doors or no doors at all 
- Winter conditions (darkness, weather and ice conditions) 
Mitigation strategy  
- Vessel design with closed and “unclimbable” 
reeling e.g. transparent inward curved plastic 
- Vessel design with automated sliding door type 
passenger gates which don’t open unless the 
vessel is firmly moored 
- Manual alarm systems in passenger spaces and 
piers with direct contact to remote monitoring 
centres 
- Video surveillance systems 
- Passenger instructions on quay and on board for 
mob situations 
- Remote monitoring centres to calm down and 
instruct people by voice after alarms 
- Lifebuoys available 
- Vessel to stop automatically in case of a man over 
board alarm 
- Well planned and rehearsed procedures, suitable 
equipment and clear roles between authorities 
for recovering a person from the water 
- Possibility for other passengers to assist or 
recover a person from the water 
- Automatic warning message to be sent to the 
surrounding vessels 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
Low 
 
Medium/High 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
Priority (1-4)  
4 
 
4 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
3 
 
1-3 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
Hazard 13. Intended jumping overboard 
Hazard H13. Intended jumping overboard 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Intended jumping overboard from a vessel leads to man over board situations and salvage 
operations. These can be difficult in the case of unmanned vessels and often requires  outside 
assistance. The hazard can have negative impact on people. It can result in injuries or loss of 
human life. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the hazard 
occurrence? 
- Vessel design with open reeling structure, too low reeling or a reeling enabling climbing. 
- Jumping in case of emergency 
- People jumping for diverse reasons 
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Mitigation strategy  
- Vessel design with closed and “unclimbable” 
reeling e.g.  transparent inward curved plastic. 
- Manual alarm systems in passenger spaces and 
piers with direct contact to remote monitoring 
centres and rescue centres 
- Video surveillance systems 
- Passenger instructions on quay and on board for 
mob situations 
- Remote monitoring centres to calm down and 
instruct people by voice after alarms 
- Lifebuoys available 
- Vessels to stop automatically in case of man over 
board alarms in order to prevent persons getting 
into the propeller 
- Well planned and rehearsed procedures, 
suitable equipment and clear roles between 
authorities for recovering a person from the 
water 
- Possibility for other passengers to assist or 
recover a person from the water 
- Automatic warning message to be sent to 
surrounding vessels 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
Low 
 
Medium/high 
 
Low 
Low 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
Priority (1-4) * 
4 
 
1 
 
 
3 
3 
 
1-3 
 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
*Mitigation priority 
scale 
Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis (combines hazards 12 and 13): 
(1) Safety control 
SC 1. Vessel design with closed and “unclimbable” reeling e.g. transparent inward curved plastic. 
SC 2. Vessel design with automated sliding door type passenger gates which don’t open unless the vessel is firmly in 
pier 
SC 3. Manual alarm systems on the passenger spaces and piers with direct access to remote monitoring centres and 
rescue centres 
SC 4. Video surveillance systems 
SC 5. Passenger instructions on piers and on board for mob situations 
SC 6. Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after alarms 
SC 7. Vessels to stop automatically in case of a man over board alarm 
SC 8. Well planned and rehearsed procedures, suitable equipment and clear roles between authorities for recovering 
a person from the water 
SC 9. Possibility for other passengers to assist or recover persons from the water 
SC 10. Automatic warning message to be sent to surrounding vessels 
 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1. Vessel design with closed and “unclimbable” reeling e.g.  transparent inward curved plastic. 
 
UCA 1. Vessel has an open reeling structure (e.g.  horizontal bars with large gaps in between) that enables falling 
overboard 
Potential causes 
- Safety has not been properly taken into account in the design  
- Lack of economic resources 
- Wish to have an attractive design (e.g. for sightseeing purposes) 
- Need to reduce weight of the vessel 
 
UCA 2. Reeling structure is easy to climb over 
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Potential causes 
- Safety has not been properly taken into account in the design 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Easy way to get on board or off board in case of emergency 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessel design with closed and “unclimbable” reeling e.g. transparent inward curved plastic: 
- The best way to prevent man over board situations is to design vessels impossible or at least very difficult to 
jump or fall overboard from 
- Emergencies have to be taken into account already in the initial design phase 
SC 2. Vessel design with automated sliding door type passenger gates which don’t open unless the vessel is firmly 
moored 
 
UCA 1. Vessel design with open ends like in cable ferries enables passengers to fall or jump overboard. 
Potential causes 
- Safety has not been properly taken into account in design 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Easy way to get on-board or off-board in case of emergency 
 
UCA 2. If doors open at the wrong time, passengers may fall or jump over board 
Potential causes 
- Sensor malfunction  
- Intentional damaging of the door 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessel design with automated sliding door type passenger gates which don’t open unless the vessel is firmly in pier: 
- Well-designed door structure with pressure sensors etc. is an effective way to control the movement of 
passengers and prevent man over board situations 
- Passenger safety in case of door malfunction has to be taken into account 
SC 3. Manual alarm systems in the passenger spaces and piers with direct contact to remote monitoring centres 
 
UCA 1. Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to send alarm about man over board situation 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Alarm systems are not connected directly to remote monitoring centres; information about the situation is 
not forwarded 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Manual alarm systems in the passenger spaces and piers with direct access to remote monitoring centres and rescue 
centres: 
- It is essential to get the information about mob situations immediately to the rescuers when someone falls or 
jumps into the water.  Delays in this information endangers the whole rescue operation 
SC 4. Video surveillance systems 
 
UCA 1. Man over board situations are not noticed, because there are no video surveillance systems for monitoring 
passenger safety on board 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Video material from vessels is not monitored continuously, automatically or manually 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of commitment 
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UCA 3. Video material is not streamed ashore from vessels in real time 
Potential causes  
- Technical problem 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 4. There is no reaction to situations captured in the video surveillance system 
Potential causes 
- Lack of commitment 
- Work overload 
- Lack of training and/or instructions 
- Human machine interface limitations 
 
UCA 5. Without active video surveillance the preventive factor cannot be achieved 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 6. Video surveillance does not perform properly 
Potential causes 
- Bad planning  
- Problems in data transfer 
- Technical problems with the camera 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources  
- Power source malfunction 
- Quality of the picture affected by weather conditions 
- Different lighting conditions have not been taken into consideration 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Video surveillance system: 
- If a person travels alone or falls over board without other passengers noticing, the situation can only be detected 
by technical means 
- Reliable real-time data transfer ashore is an essential part of the system if a human does the monitoring 
- Existence of video surveillance can prevent erratic behaviour. With active monitoring, persons can also interfere 
with the situations 
- Technical specifications of the system should be planned and implemented efficiently 
- The video surveillance system itself has to be monitored continuously 
SC 5. Passenger instructions on quay and on board for man over board situation 
 
UCA 1. Passenger instructions are poor or not easy enough to understand 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the instructions 
Potential causes 
- Positioning of the instructions 
- Visual look of the instructions 
- Language barrier 
- Time constraint 
- Wrong means for providing instructions 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Passenger instructions on piers and on board for man over board situations: 
- Other passengers on board are the best available resource in an emergency, if they know what to do 
- Good passenger information is clear, simple and does not leave place for misunderstandings 
- If the information is visually interesting and the means for giving it are correct, people are more likely to read, 
listen or watch it.  
SC 6. Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after alarms 
47 
 
 
UCA 1. People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act irrationally, because the system for instructing people 
by voice does not exist 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Connection between vessels and the monitoring centres does not work 
Potential causes 
- Technical problems 
- Lack of redundancy 
 
UCA 3. The way of giving the instructions is not suitable and they are not followed on board 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning  
- Psychological factors have not been considered deeply enough when planning the messages 
- Persons in charge of the situation have not been properly trained 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after alarms: 
-  Calming of the passengers is necessary in order to keep them functional and prevent irrational actions that 
make the situation worse. With detailed instructions, untrained people are able to perform operations they 
would not be able to do on their own 
- Persons giving instructions have to be well trained in the LSA functions as well as in crowd and crisis 
management 
- Connections between vessel and shore have to be reliable and there have to be redundancies 
SC 7.  Vessel to stop automatically in case of man over board alarm 
 
UCA 1. The vessel is not programmed to stop in case of a mob alarm and person in the water gets into the moving 
vessel’s propeller  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
 
UCA 2. Persons cannot be found again and/or the passengers are not able to assist because the vessel has continued 
on her route  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessels to stop automatically in case of man over board alarms: 
- Stopping the vessel without delay after an alarm protects the person in the water and ensures that he/she can 
get all available help  
- The propeller of the vessel should be properly covered if the engines are running at the man over board scene 
SC 8. Well planned and rehearsed procedures, suitable equipment and clear roles between authorities for recovering 
a person from the water 
 
UCA 1. Assistance for recovering a person from the water takes too long to arrive 
Potential causes 
- Information about the situation has not been received or is not correct 
- Boats or personnel are not available close enough 
- It is unclear who should respond to the situation 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Well planned and rehearsed procedures, suitable equipment and clear roles between authorities for recovering a 
person from the water: 
- In man over board situations there is no time for planning, only for well-rehearsed action  
- Man over board situations may happen in areas where there is no help available close by. Co-operation between 
authorities increases the amount of available resources and speed up rescuing 
SC 9. Possibility for other passengers or the vessel to assist or recover a person from the water  
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UCA 1. Vessel’s hull and structure is designed so “safe” that the passengers on board cannot assist or recover anyone 
from the water 
Potential causes 
- High reeling without any “emergency exits”
UCA 2. The LSA equipment available are too complicated to be used by untrained people 
Potential causes 
- Lack of suitable equipment in the market
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features
- Lack of economic resources
UCA 3. Without automatic LSA equipment operated by the vessel, the person in the water may not get help 
Potential causes  
- Lack of suitable equipment in the market
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features
- Lack of economic resources
Redefining of the safety control 
Possibility for other passengers or the vessel to assist or recover a person from the water: 
- Autonomous vessels should be designed to protect people and keep them inside. However, there must be
emergency exits and devices that can be used to pull a person on board from the water
- All LSA-equipment on board should be easily available, simple, safe and easy to use for untrained persons
- Automatic LSA equipment such as lifebuoys, ladders, slides, ramps, or emergency lighting should be
automatically activated by the vessel
SC 10. Automatic warning message to be sent to surrounding vessels 
UCA 1. An autonomous vessel does not inform the surrounding vessels about the mob situation and therefore they 
cannot assist.  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features
- Lack of suitable means to inform other vessels
UCA 2. Autonomous vessel does not inform the surrounding vessels about the mob situation and another vessel runs 
over the person in the water 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessel’s safety features
- Lack of suitable means to inform other vessels
Redefining of the safety control 
An automatic warning message to be sent to surrounding vessels: 
- Other vessels in the area are most likely the fastest available assistance, but only if they know the situation
- Without information about the mob situation, they are an imminent danger to the person in the water
Hazard 14. Persons getting injured 
Hazard H14. Persons getting injured 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
Persons being injured may lead to medical emergencies on board or on piers. 
The hazard can have negative impact on people. It can result in injuries or loss of human 
life. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Slipping, tripping or falling
- Violence by other passengers
- Automatic doors with malfunction in the sensors
Mitigation strategy 
- Good lighting and air conditioning
Cost/Difficulty 
Low 
Priority (1-4) * 
3 
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- Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor 
materials in piers and the vessel 
- Manual alarm systems in the passenger spaces 
and on piers with direct contact to remote 
monitoring centres 
- Vessels re-route to the closest medical 
evacuation pier and transmit their position to the 
authorities.  
- Video surveillance systems 
- Passenger instructions on piers and on board for 
medical emergencies 
- Remote monitoring centres to calm down and 
instruct people by voice after alarms 
- Well planned and rehearsed procedures for 
medical evacuation 
- Possibility for other passengers to give first aid to 
injured persons 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
4 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
 
Hazard 15. Person(s) medical condition 
Hazard H15. Person(s)  medical condition 
Hazard effect/ 
description 
Provide extra details regarding the designated severity rating 
If a passenger gets sick or has a seizure it may lead to a medical emergency on board or on 
a pier. 
The hazard can have negative impact on people. It can result in injuries or loss of human 
life. 
Causal factors Describe the hazard as system state. What conditions could influence the effect of the 
hazard occurrence? 
- Movement of the vessel 
- Heat 
- Allergic reactions 
- Passengers not having necessary personal medication with them 
Mitigation strategy  
- Good lighting and air conditioning 
- Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor 
materials in  piers and vessels 
- Manual alarm systems in passenger spaces and  
piers with direct contact to remote monitoring 
centres 
- Vessels re-route to the closest medical 
evacuation pier and transmit their position to the 
authorities 
- Video surveillance systems 
- Passenger instructions on piers and on board for 
medical emergencies 
- Remote monitoring centre to calm down and 
instruct people by voice after the alarm 
- Well planned and rehearsed procedure for 
medical evacuation 
- Possibility for other passengers to give first aid to 
an injured person 
Cost/Difficulty  
Low 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Priority (1-4) * 
3 
4 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
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*Mitigation priority scale Level 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Description 
Eliminate 
Prevent 
Control 
Reduce 
Detailed description 
Complete elimination of the hazard 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard will occur 
Reduction of the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident 
Reduction of the damage if the accident occurs 
 
STPA Analysis (combines hazards 14 and 15): 
(1) Safety control 
SC 1. Good lighting and air conditioning 
SC 2. Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor materials in piers and the vessel 
SC 3. Manual alarm systems in the passenger spaces and on piers with direct contact to remote monitoring centre 
and rescue centre 
SC 4. Vessels re-route to the closest medical evacuation pier and transmit their position to the authorities 
SC 5. Video surveillance systems 
SC 6. Passenger instructions on piers and on board for medical emergencies 
SC 7. Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after the alarm 
SC 8. Well planned and rehearsed procedures for medical evacuation 
SC 9. Possibility for other passengers to give first aid to injured persons 
(2) Detecting potentially Unsafe Controlled Actions (UCAs) and (3) redefining the safety control 
SC 1 Good lighting and air conditioning 
 
UCA 1. Person cannot see obstructions and accidentally falls  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of light source locations and luminosity 
- Obstructions create shadows 
- Blackout 
 
UCA 2. High temperatures can trigger seizures or medical conditions 
Potential causes 
- Vessel design 
- Blackout 
- Inadequate AC system 
- Power saving  
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Good lighting and air conditioning: 
- Good lighting ensures that passengers can move safely  
- With proper temperature on board, passengers remain calm and alert, and it reduces the risk of seizures and 
medical conditions  
SC 2 Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor materials in piers and vessels 
 
UCA 1. The entrance to vessels is not level  
Potential causes 
- Pier and vessel entrances are not on the same level 
- Steps 
 
UCA 1.  Vessel or pier floors are covered with slippery coating and a passenger falls 
Potential causes 
- poor planning 
- Water, snow or ice on the floor 
- Spill or litter 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor materials in piers and vessels 
- Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor material in piers and vessels ensure that passengers can move safely 
in all weather conditions 
SC 3 Manual alarm systems in passenger spaces and piers with direct contact to remote monitoring centres 
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UCA 1. Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to send alarms in case of medical emergencies 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
-  
UCA 2. Alarm systems are not connected directly to the remote monitoring centres the information about the 
situation is not forwarded 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Manual alarm systems on the passenger spaces and piers with direct access to remote monitoring centre: 
- It is essential to get the information about the medical emergency immediately to the authorities.  Delay in this 
information endangers the safety of the patient 
SC 4 Vessels re-route to the closest medical evacuation pier and transmit their position to the authorities 
  
UCA 1. If vessels continue to the next planned pier there might arise a delay for patients to get the medical attention 
needed 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning and testing 
- There is no alarm or information about the situation 
- Software error 
 
UCA 2. The information about the emergency pier does not reach the authorities or it is incorrect 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning and testing 
- Conflicting information from different sources 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Vessels re-route to the closest medical evacuation pier and transmit their position to the authorities: 
- The patient safety has to be prioritized and medical attention reached as soon as possible 
- Special attention should be payed to the information flow and the planning of emergency harbours  
SC 5. Video surveillance systems 
 
UCA 1. A medical emergency is not noticed, because there is no video surveillance system to monitor passenger 
safety on board 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessel’s safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Video material from the vessel is not monitored continuously, automatically or manually 
Potential causes 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Lack of commitment 
-  
UCA 3. Video material is not transferred ashore from the vessel in real time. 
Potential causes  
- Technical problem 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 4. There is no reaction to situations captured in the video surveillance systems 
Potential causes 
- Lack of commitment 
- Work overload 
- Lack of training and/or instructions 
- Human machine interface limitations 
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UCA 5. Video surveillance does not perform properly 
Potential causes 
- Bad planning  
- Problems in data transfer 
- Technical problems with the camera 
- Lack of redundancy 
- Lack of economic resources  
- Power source malfunction 
- Quality of the picture affected by weather conditions 
- Different lighting conditions are not taken into consideration 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Video surveillance system: 
- If a person travels alone, situations can only be detected by technical means 
- Reliable real-time data transfer ashore is an essential part of the system if a human does monitoring 
- Technical specifications of the system should be planned and implemented efficiently 
- The video surveillance system itself has to be monitored continuously 
SC 6. Passenger instructions for medical emergencies on piers and on board  
 
UCA 1. Passenger instructions are poor or not easy enough to understand 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
 
UCA 2. Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the instructions 
Potential causes 
- Positioning of the instructions 
- Visual look of the instructions 
- Language barrier 
- Time constraint 
- Wrong means for providing instructions 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Passenger instructions on piers and on board for medical emergencies: 
- Other passengers on board are the best available resource in an emergency, if they know what to do 
- Good passenger information is clear, simple and does not leave place for misunderstandings 
- If the information is visually interesting and the means for giving it is suitable, people are more likely to read, 
listen or watch it.   
SC 7 Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after alarms 
 
UCA 1. People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act irrationally, because the system for instructing people 
by voice does not exist 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning of vessels’ safety features 
- Lack of economic resources 
 
UCA 2. Connection between vessels and the monitoring centres does not work 
Potential causes 
- Technical problem 
- Lack of redundancy 
 
UCA 3. The way of giving instructions is not suitable and they are not followed on board 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning  
- Psychological factors have not been considered deeply enough in planning the messages 
- Persons in charge of the situation has not been properly trained 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Remote monitoring centres to calm down and instruct people by voice after alarms: 
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- Calming of passengers if necessary in order to keep them functional and prevent irrational actions that make 
the situation worse. With detailed instructions, untrained people are able to perform operations they would not 
be able to do on their own 
- Persons giving instructions have to be well trained in the medical first aid as well as in crowd and crisis 
management 
- Connections between vessels and shore have to be reliable and include redundancies 
SC 8 Well planned and rehearsed procedures for medical evacuation 
 
UCA 1. Medical assistance takes too long to arrive 
Potential causes 
- Information about situations is not received or is not correct 
- Boats or personnel are not available close enough 
- It is unclear who should respond to the situation 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Well planned and rehearsed procedures for medical evacuation: 
- In medical emergencies, there is no time for planning, only for well-rehearsed action  
- Medical emergencies may happen in areas where there is no help available close by. Co-operation between 
authorities increases the amount of available resources and speed up the process 
SC  9 Possibility for other passengers to give first aid to injured persons 
 
UCA 1. There is no first aid equipment  
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of economic resources 
- They have been stolen 
- They have not been replaced after having been used 
 
UCA 2. First aid equipment available are too complicated to be used by untrained people 
Potential causes 
- Poor planning 
- Lack of economic resources 
- Instructions are missing or bad 
 
Redefining of the safety control 
Possibility for other passengers to give first aid to injured persons: 
- First aid equipment on board should be easily available, simple, safe and easy to use for untrained persons 
- First aid equipment should be placed so that they cannot be easily tampered, e.g. inside cabinets with alarms if 
opened. 
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4.2.3 The representation of the initial safety management strategy for ferry A and B: step 
five 
 
The initial safety management strategy for ferries A and B consists of 73 safety controls, which have 
different approaches for mitigating the 15 defined hazards and for preventing and responding to the 
10 defined accidents.  
Table 2 below presents the safety controls, their control logic principles and the risk they aim to 
mitigate. The safety controls are grouped by the hazard. The safety control types are categorized with 
colours: orange (controls that attempt to eliminate the hazard), yellow (controls for reducing the 
likelihood that the hazard will occur), green (controls for reducing the likelihood that the hazard results 
in an accident), and blue (controls for reducing the damage if the accident occurs). 
 
Table 2. Safety controls, control logic principles and the risks mitigated, grouped by the hazards 
Hazard 1. Object detection sensor error 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
1. Sensor system 
redundancy and diversity 
If one sensor fails the redundancy ensures there 
is another sensor functioning. The equipment 
chosen to provide the redundancy has to be 
correct in order to provide the user with the 
required information at all times 
> Lack of information due to error in a single sensor                                                                 
>  Undetected sensor failure 
> External or common cause failure affecting all 
equipment simultaneously 
1. UPS (Uninterrupted 
Power Source) 
If there is a disturbance in the vessel power 
system the UPS can temporarily provide power 
for the critical equipment. When the UPS setup is 
planned, installed and maintained properly, the 
user can count on a reliable backup system 
> Disturbances in vessels’ power systems affect vessels’ 
object detection sensors’ operation 
> The UPS does not work or takes too long to switch on                                                                   
 > The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide 
power for the equipment  
2. Appropriate heating, 
cooling and cleaning 
systems 
By applying sensors with proper heating and/or 
cooling systems it can be ensured that they 
function properly in all operating conditions. 
Proper automatic cleaning systems ensure the 
appropriate function of the sensors outdoors 
> Equipment is not able to function properly in winter 
conditions                                     
> Equipment is not able to function properly due to high 
temperatures 
> Equipment lens is dirty 
> Condensation inside equipment 
3.Thorough 
commissioning of 
equipment set 
When the equipment set is thoroughly tested and 
certified (preferably by an independent body) it 
ensures that the equipment function properly, 
are compatible and the operation can be run 
safely. 
> The equipment set has not been properly tested or not 
tested at all before operation 
4. Appropriate and 
continuous on board 
maintenance programs 
By implementing an on board maintenance 
program it can be ensured that all critical systems 
remain functional at all times. A well planned 
maintenance program covers all necessary areas 
on board and it is adjusted separately for each 
vessel. Maintenance done timely and according 
to the program by competent personnel ensures 
the smooth operation of the sensors.  
> There is no on board maintenance program 
> The maintenance program does not cover the 
necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware                                                                                                                                  
> The maintenance program is not followed or the 
maintenance is not done properly        
5. Continuous system 
diagnosis and proof 
testing 
Ensures that the system functions as it should. 
Test design should be planned carefully and 
updated after changes in the system in order to 
cover all the necessary functions and recognize 
problems. Possible effect on the operation 
should be taken into account in the planning. 
> There is no continuous system diagnosis and proof 
testing                                                       
> The continuous system diagnosis and proof testing do 
not cover all necessary functions 
> The test is not able to recognize problems 
1. Autonomous integrity 
monitoring 
A Well designed and up to date integrity 
monitoring system ensures that the data has not 
been damaged or manipulated 
> There is no integrity monitoring  
> Integrity monitoring gives wrong information 
Hazard 2. Artificial Intelligence (AI) failure 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
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2. Thorough planning, 
testing and 
commissioning of AI 
Software 
Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of 
AI software ensure that the software is robust 
and free of errors. Applicable standards should be 
followed. 
> Thorough planning, testing and commissioning of AI 
are not done 
> Insufficient planning, testing and commissioning of AI  
6. Computer and software 
redundancy 
Computer and software redundancy ensure the 
availability of the AI functions at all times  
> Computer breaks down and there is not computer and 
software redundancy 
> Secondary computer does not take over in case of a 
failure 
1. UPS (Uninterrupted 
Power Source) 
If there is a disturbance in the vessel power 
system, the UPS can temporarily provide power 
for the critical equipment. When the UPS setup is 
planned, installed and maintained properly, the 
user can count on a reliable backup system 
> Disturbances in vessels’ power systems affect vessels’ 
AI systems’ operation 
>  The UPS does not work or takes too long to switch on                                                                                    
> The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide 
power for the AI system as long as needed or the 
capacity in terms of power and/or energy of the UPS is 
exceeded 
7. Appropriate cooling for 
computers 
In order to function properly all computer 
components must be kept within permissible 
operating temperature limits.  
Cooling systems should be selected carefully. 
Both the waste heat produced by the computer 
components and possible external heat sources 
should be taken in to account. 
> Computer does not function reliably due to 
overheating.  
 
4. Appropriate and 
continuous on board 
maintenance programs  
By implementing a maintenance program it can 
be ensured that all critical systems remain 
functional at all times. A well-planned 
maintenance program covers all necessary areas 
on board and it is adjusted separately for each 
vessel. Maintenance done timely and according 
to the program by competent personnel ensures 
smooth operation. Special attention should be 
paid not only to properly timed software updates 
but also to the updating process. 
> There is no on board maintenance program  
> The maintenance program does not cover the 
necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware                                                                                
> The maintenance program is not followed or the 
maintenance is not done properly          
> Software updates are not done and the system is not 
capable to correct detected issues                                                                                                         
> Software updates create inappropriate functions in the 
system              
 > Software and hardware do not match 
3. Robust system design Robust system design should be able to isolate  
failures in the system and to let the rest of the 
system operate.  
> Poor and/or missing data are not detected and coped 
with                                                                                       
> Single point failures takes the whole system down 
8. Appropriate system 
(software) design and 
maintenance  processes 
Ensure that the system meets customer 
expectations. Requires good communication 
between customers, sales people and 
developers, but also good documentation. 
Special attention should be paid to reviews 
throughout the process and software verification 
at the end. Change management must not be 
forgotten. 
> User requirements are not known or taken into 
account and the final product is not the expected                                                                                    
> System requirements are not clear for the developers 
and do not cover relevant issues                                                                                                         
> System design and system implementation do not 
meet expectations      
> Software is not verified properly 
> Change management is not working properly 
3. Technical fault (e.g. mechanical failure) 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
4. Redundancy of critical 
systems 
With redundancy in the systems the effect of the 
single failure can be minimized. Redundancy and 
system integration should be taken into account 
already in the planning stage. Proper testing and 
commissioning of the system verifies that all 
critical systems have been identified. Changes in 
the system should be managed with a proper 
protocol/ process. 
>  Single failures can cause vessel operation to stop 
> Critical equipment has not been identified correctly                                                     
> Critical systems have been changed without proper 
analysis of the effects on the system 
5. Thorough planning, 
testing and 
commissioning of all 
technical systems 
The process should be done in good cooperation 
between the designer, buyer, builder, suppliers 
and regulators. The autonomous status of the 
vessel should be taken into account through the 
process. New and efficient practices for 
commissioning and testing autonomous vessel 
systems should be developed in cooperation with 
the relevant stakeholders. 
> Autonomous operations have not been taken into 
account in the whole system design 
> Tests fail to recognize problems or potential faults in 
the systems 
> The commissioning is not done thoroughly 
9. Planned and predictive 
maintenance programs 
With proper maintenance programs the safety of 
the vessel can be ensured, the number of 
technical faults minimized and the life cycle of 
technical systems maximized. Maintenance 
programs have to take into account system 
interactions.  
> The system fails due to the lack of maintenance                                                                                         
>  The maintenance done is not of the right type or it is 
done poorly                                                                                     
> Maintenance programs fail to take into account 
interaction between systems 
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10. Distance monitoring 
and fault detection of  
technical systems  
Safe and effective operation of autonomous 
vessels require distance monitoring and failure 
detection. Remote monitoring increases the 
reliability of the operation and minimizes off-hire 
periods. Without proper monitoring of the data 
quality, distance monitoring and fault detection 
systems cannot produce reliable information.  
> Vessel faults are not  detected                                                                                                                                                       
> Distance monitoring and fault detection of technical 
systems do not work 
4. Heavy weather/sea conditions + 5. Strong currents 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
6. Correctly set and 
followed operational 
limits 
Permanent operational limits set by shipping 
companies and agreed between all the parties 
involved, ensure that operations are stopped 
before the safety of the vessel is compromised. 
Vessels’ features, capability to manoeuvre and 
operating areas should be considered when 
setting the operational limits. When the limits 
and automatic procedures for situations when 
the limits are crossed  are programmed in vessel 
systems, they are followed without the need to 
make decision case by case. Thus they are not  
exposed to human error. Sending an alarm to 
remote monitoring centres, when limits are 
crossed, acts as a double check in order to ensure 
that the vessel is able to cease her operations 
safely. 
> Shipping companies have not set operational limits for 
the vessel. 
> Operational limits set by shipping companies are too 
high for safe operation of vessels 
> Operational limits set for vessels are not followed. 
11. Weather routing and 
constant weather and sea 
state monitoring 
Checking weather forecasts should always be 
part of route planning. Checking forecasts 
automatically against the plan (also in the 
permanent routes between two points) every 
time before departure ensures vessel safety. 
Constant automatic monitoring of weather 
forecasts as well as local real-time weather data 
during the trip, ensure the safety along the whole 
way. Receiving weather forecasts from more 
than one source gives redundancy and allows 
comparison. With pre-planned alternative routes 
programmed to the system, vessels can 
automatically be re-routed safely when 
necessary. Re-routing functions should always be 
properly tested in the commission stage. 
> Environmental conditions are not taken into account 
when planning vessel routes 
> Weather and sea state are not constantly monitored 
when vessels are in operation 
> Vessel’s route is not changed accordingly when 
environmental conditions require doing so. 
12. Vessels equipped with 
adequate environmental 
sensors for local 
conditions 
With proper equipment on board (or along the 
route), vessels are able to react also to sudden 
local changes in the conditions. Already when 
planning vessels, winter conditions and other 
local needs, equipment characteristics required 
in the area as well as redundancy needs should 
be  considered carefully. 
> Vessels are not equipped with adequate and 
appropriate sensors in order to monitor local conditions                                                                                                               
>  There is not enough redundancy in environmental 
sensors 
2. Keeping vessels steady 
against the wind and 
waves, heading to an 
emergency harbour or 
anchoring   
If an unexpected weather change makes 
continuing on the route unsafe, automatic route 
specific contingency actions (such as driving with 
minimum manoeuvring speed against the wind 
etc. or re-routing vessels to a suitable emergency 
harbour) programmed to the system are 
necessary precautions. 
> In case that the weather/sea conditions change 
suddenly over the operational limits, vessels continue on 
their routes normally instead of choosing a safer option 
for the situation. 
3. Knowledge of local 
currents and other local 
environmental conditions 
Available information about local currents and 
frequent weather conditions is a valuable tool 
when planning vessels and their routes. 
Especially in archipelagos, lakes and rivers there 
can be strong local currents, places where fog 
regularly forms or where the wave height rises 
above normal.. 
> Information about local currents and local 
environmental conditions in rivers and archipelagos has 
not been gathered                                                                                                   
> Information about local currents and local 
environmental conditions has not been taken into 
account when planning vessel routes 
4. Constant monitoring of  
currents and adjusting the 
steering accordingly 
Vessels reliably equipped to monitor affecting 
real time currents, automatically adjusting 
steering accordingly, without delay, are able to 
manoeuvre and dock safely and smoothly. 
> There is no equipment available to monitor the current 
in real time                                                                                   
> Current monitoring systems do not function correctly                                                                  
> Current monitoring information is not connected to 
the AI and steering equipment                                                                                                                                                   
> Too long delays in the steering system to react to 
drifting. 
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5. Constant monitoring 
and predictions of vessels’ 
capability 
With constant monitoring and prediction of 
vessels’ capability, vessels are able to adjust  
operational limits and operation in general when 
necessary. There might be external or internal 
factors that require lowering the operational 
limits temporarily. 
> Vessel capability is not monitored                                                                                                      
> Information of vessel capability is not used to adjust 
the operational limits or operation. 
6. Position reference equipment failure 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
7. Equipment (sensor) 
redundancy 
If one sensor fails, redundancy ensures there is 
another sensor functioning. System design must 
include adequate diagnosing functions in order to 
recognize sensor failures and perform the switch 
over procedure when necessary. Equipment used 
to provide redundancy should be completely 
independent from one another to reduce the risk 
of a common cause failure taking it down at the 
same time 
> Lack of information due to  error in a single sensor 
> Sensor failures are not detected due to lack of 
information from other equipment to be compared with                                                                                                   
> External or common cause failures take several 
equipment down at the same time 
6. Combinations of 
different types of local 
and satellite position 
reference systems 
Combination of local and satellite position 
reference systems provide reliable position 
information in different conditions and locations, 
and help to detect possible errors in the 
information 
> Positioning is based on satellite positioning only and 
vessel e.g. loses her position in case of a satellite system 
failure or poor satellite availability                              
> Satellite positioning reference equipment gives 
incorrect information and there is no local positioning 
information to compare it with                                                            
> Positioning is based on local position reference systems 
only and vessels e.g. lose position due to poor weather 
conditions 
13. Satellite positioning 
equipment with  jamming 
detection and/or anti-
jamming function 
Jamming detection ensures that jamming is 
noticed and users can switch to local position 
reference systems. An anti-jamming function 
reduces the risk of losing position or receiving 
wrong/inaccurate position information due to 
GPS jamming. 
> Vessels lose position due to jamming                                                                            
> Vessels receive wrong or inaccurate position 
information due to jamming 
1. UPS (Uninterrupted 
Power Source) 
If there is a disturbance in the vessel power 
system, UPSs can temporarily provide power for  
critical equipment. When UPS setup is planned, 
installed and maintained properly, the user can 
count on reliable backup systems. For GPS 
systems a UPS with a quick switch on function is 
critical. In case of power loss GPS equipment 
need to reacquire the position fix which may take 
several minutes at worst case 
> Disturbances in vessels’ power systems affect 
operation of vessels’ position reference equipment                                                                                                                                
> The UPS does not work  
> The UPS takes too long to switch on and the GPS 
equipment needs to reacquire the position fix                                                                                                                                      
> The capacity of the UPS is not sufficient to provide 
power for the equipment as long as needed or the 
capacity in terms of power and/or energy of the UPS is 
exceeded 
14. Appropriate heating, 
cooling and cleaning 
systems   
By applying sensors with proper heating and/or 
cooling systems it can be ensured that they 
function properly in all operating conditions. 
Applying sensors with automatic cleaning 
systems ensure that they function properly 
outdoors  
> Equipment is not able to function properly in winter 
conditions                                        
> Equipment is not able to function properly due to high 
temperature s                    
> Equipment lenses are dirty  
> Condensation inside equipment 
15. Thorough installation 
and commissioning of 
equipment set  
Placing of GPS antennas has to be optimal with 
regards to sky view and distance to transmitting 
radio equipment. Installations of the GPS 
antennas and cabling have to be thoroughly 
planned and performed by certified suppliers. An 
unobstructed sensor head and antenna view is 
essential when using local position reference 
systems. When the equipment set is thoroughly 
tested and certified (preferably by an 
independent body) it ensures that the equipment 
functions properly, are compatible and the 
operation can be run safely. 
> GPS antennas have limited sky view                                                            
> GPS antennas are placed too close to radio equipment 
causing interference                     
> GPS antennas’ cable length and amplification are not 
optimized                                      
> Local position reference systems’ sensor head or 
antenna view is blocked by obstacles                                                                                                                                                
> The equipment set has not been properly tested or not 
tested at all before operation. 
16. Appropriate and 
continuous on board 
maintenance programs   
By implementing on board maintenance 
programs it can be ensured that all critical 
systems remain functional at all times. A well-
planned maintenance program covers all 
necessary areas on board and it is adjusted 
separately for each vessel. Maintenance done 
timely and accordingly to the program by 
competent personnel ensures smooth operation 
of the sensors 
> There is no on board maintenance program                                                                       
> The maintenance program does not cover the 
necessary elements and the life cycle of the hardware                                                                                                                   
> The maintenance program is not followed                                                                         
or the maintenance is not done properly. 
58 
 
17. Continuous system 
diagnosis and proof 
testing 
Continuous system diagnosis and regular proof 
testing ensure that the system functions, as it 
should. Test design should be planned carefully 
and updated after changes in the system in order 
to cover all necessary functions and recognize 
potential problems. Possible effects on the 
operation caused by the tests should be taken 
into account in the planning 
> There is no continuous system diagnosis and proof 
testing                                                        
> The continuous system diagnosis and proof testing do 
not cover all necessary functions 
> The test is not able to recognize problems 
1. Autonomous Integrity 
monitoring 
Well designed and up to date integrity 
monitoring systems ensure that the data has not 
been damaged or manipulated  
> There is no integrity monitoring 
> Integrity monitoring gives wrong information  
> Integrity monitoring is not able to recognize spoofing 
signals 
7. Overloading of vessels 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
8. Automated passenger 
gates  which do not allow 
more than maximum 
number of passengers on 
board 
With reliable passenger count, overloading of 
vessels and exceeding of maximum number of 
passengers can be avoided. The systems have to 
take into account that people stay on-board, 
people travel without tickets, wheelchairs, and 
families with children, bikes, baby strollers etc. 
who can not board vessels though passenger 
gates. Gates should not separate parents and 
children. Possible solutions for counting reliably 
could be e.g. automatic software and camera 
systems that compare passengers going in and 
out, defining a boarding processes and boarding 
areas on the pier, or emptying the vessel 
completely before reloading. 
> There is no system to count the number of passengers 
on-board                           
> Passenger count system is not reliable                                                                                                
> The passenger gates separate family members (parents 
and children) 
9. Clear rules, weighing 
and monitoring of the 
cargo taken on board 
By monitoring the vessel’s trim, list and draft the 
weight of the vessel can be calculated. Possible 
solutions for calculating the weight are e.g. 
pressure sensors, echo sounders and visual 
readings of draft. 
> Vessels are overloaded because there is no knowledge 
of weight of cargo on-board                                                                                                                                                             
> Cargo weighing systems  are not reliable 
10. In case of adding 
permanent weights on 
board, stability 
calculations and tests to 
be redone. 
If stability calculations are not up to date the 
vessel operation may not be safe and according 
to regulations. 
>The added weights are not recorded                                                                                                    
>The recorded weights are inaccurate                                                                                                  
> The stability tests/calculations are not updated 
11. Automatic continuous 
monitoring of vessels’ 
stability (draft, trim, list 
and GM), and the vessel is 
programmed not to leave 
the pier if over the limits.   
There should always be real-time information 
available about vessel stability in order to operate 
safely. By programming the safety limits allowed 
into the system, leaving a pier can be prevented 
in unsafe stability situations. With redundant 
monitoring systems, unnecessary stops in 
operation or unsafe situations caused by an 
equipment malfunction can be minimized 
> There is no system to monitor vessel stability 
> Vessel does not leave pier even though the vessel is 
loaded correctly                          
> The vessel leaves the pier overloaded                                                                                 
> There is only one monitoring system with no 
redundancy 
8. Shifting of weights 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
18. Passenger instructions 
on quay and on board 
Good passenger information is clear, simple and 
doesn’t leave place for misunderstandings. If the 
information is visually interesting and the means 
for providing it are correct, people are more likely 
to read, listen to or watch it.   
> Passenger instructions regarding weight distribution 
are poor or not easy enough to understand                                
> Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the 
instructions                                                                                      
19. Design of vessel With good ship design, passenger and cargo 
movements and stability can be controlled.  For 
example seating arrangements can be used as  
natural dividers and the vessel can be designed 
with a very high initial stability. 
>The design does not prevent people from crowding or 
falling to one side of vessels                                                                                                                                                    
> Vessels lists considerably in case of crowding of people 
on one side 
> Cargo and storage spaces do not have any 
compartments that would prevent items from shifting to 
one side of the vessel 
12. Firefighting systems 
that use very little water 
or no water at all  
When selecting firefighting systems to be 
installed on-board, stability and free surface 
effect caused by the firefighting water should be 
taken into account. 
> The use of large amounts of firefighting water creates 
free surfaces and may endanger vessel stability. 
13. Anti-heeling system   Anti-healing systems compensate for small heels 
and increases the comfort and safety of the 
passengers. However, a possible malfunction of 
> Listing of vessels cannot be corrected and it causes 
danger or discomfort for the passengers.                                                    
> Malfunctioning of the anti-heeling system may 
endanger the safety of the vessel  
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the system must not be able to endanger the 
safety of the vessel.  
7. Remote monitoring 
centres monitor vessel 
stability and instruct 
people by voice if 
necessary 
Calming of passengers is necessary in order to 
keep them functional and prevent irrational 
actions that make situations worse. With detailed 
instructions, untrained people are able to 
perform operations they would not be able to do 
on their own. Persons giving instructions have to 
be well trained in basic ship stability as well as 
crowd and crisis management. Connections 
between vessel and shore have to be reliable and 
there have to be redundancies. 
> People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act 
irrationally, because there is no system for instructing 
people  
 > Connections between vessel and monitoring centres 
do not work 
 > The way of giving instructions is not suitable and they 
are not followed onboard 
9. Flooding 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
14. Double hull and 
compartments 
A double hull and a compartmented structure 
help autonomous vessels to maintain stability in 
case of accidents. 
> Single hull allows large amounts of water to flood the 
spaces under the waterline very quickly if penetrated.                                                                                                                    
> Vessels lose stability due to the water moving freely 
inside the hull 
15. Well planned and built 
piping system 
Using double wall pipes and correct materials for 
pipes and connection points, depending on the 
systems, make the piping systems resistant and 
less likely to break. Good planning, building, 
testing, and oversight of the whole process make 
piping systems reliable, easy to use and maintain. 
> Bursting of a single wall pipe allows the water (or other 
liquids) to leak to the spaces inside the hull.                                                                                                              
> Rigid metal piping breaks easier due to vibrations or 
pressure shocks than other types of piping.                                         
> Complex piping systems with many connection points 
are more likely to break and leak                                                                                                                                                                    
> There are only system drawings and no production 
drawings and construction workers have to make 
decisions about the details 
8. Automatic monitoring 
systems for tanks, pipes, 
bilges, and cofferdams 
Leaks and bursts in hull and piping can be 
detected quickly by automatic monitoring 
systems. In case of accidents, vessel stability can 
also be evaluated and possible actions planned 
accordingly. However, the function of the 
monitoring systems needs to be monitored itself. 
> If an autonomous vessel, without an automatic 
monitoring system for tanks, bilges and cofferdams has 
an accident, vessel stability problems and possible leaks 
cannot be detected. 
>  A burst pipe in the engine room is not noticed 
20. Firefighting systems 
that use very little water 
or no water at all 
Reduce the possibility that firefighting water 
causes stability problems to vessels and therefore 
allows systems to be used as long as necessary. 
May damage vessel equipment less compared to 
a situation when large amounts of water are used 
in firefighting. One good option could be to use 
aerosol systems (potassium based) for fire 
extinguishing and water mist systems for cooling 
> Vessels lose stability due to large amounts of water 
used in firefighting 
> Firefighting water damages vessel equipment 
21. Good drainage 
systems on deck 
Remove water from the deck efficiently and 
reduce possible stability problems. Winter 
conditions have to be taken into account when 
planning  drainage systems. 
> Rainwater and sea spray flood the deck and weaken 
vessel stability due to the lack of efficient drainage 
systems                                                                                                        
> The drainage system is blocked by dirt or debris, or by 
ice in winter conditions 
9. Effective bilge pumps Keep the vessel afloat if there is water in the 
engine room and gives time for evacuating 
passengers. They protect vessel equipment and 
systems in case of flooding. Pump redundancy 
and emergency power systems have to be taken 
into account 
> Bilge pumps are not effective enough to pump out the 
water coming in from a penetration in the hull                                                                                                                             
> Bilge pumps break and there is no redundancy                                                                       
> Bilge pumps are not connected to the emergency 
power system 
10. Ignition of electrical equipment and wiring 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
22. Thorough planning 
and commissioning of 
electrical equipment and 
wiring 
Thorough planning and commissioning of 
electrical equipment and wiring ensure that the 
components, wiring and equipment chosen are 
the correct ones for the actual use of the vessel 
and the installation and penetrations are done 
properly. The testing of the electrical equipment 
and wiring, detects the possible faults in the 
system 
> Wrong equipment and wiring or their installation cause 
fires or cause fires to spread more rapidly than normally                                                                                                                                
> Information used in the planning stage does not 
correlate with the use of the system 
> Testing is poorly planned and done 
23. Appropriate cooling 
and heating for electrical 
systems 
By providing appropriate cooling and heating for 
electrical systems, the overheating and problems 
caused by humidity can be prevented 
> Overheating of the equipment breaks the equipment 
or causes a fire 
> Condensation causes a short circuit in electrical 
equipment 
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24. Preventive 
maintenance programs 
Preventive maintenance programs are the best 
way to prevent ignition of electrical equipment 
and wiring. By checking the cleanliness, 
connections and proper function of the 
protection equipment regularly, the risk of 
ignition of electrical equipment and wiring can be 
reduced 
> Dust in the equipment may result in overheating and 
ignition                                                                                         
> Loose connections may result in overheating and 
ignition                                                          
> Malfunction of the circuit breakers or other protection 
components e.g.  arc protection system 
16. Circuit breakers and 
fault current protection 
Circuit breakers and fault current protection 
protect equipment and prevent the risk of 
ignition of the electrical equipment and wiring 
> Circuit breakers do not open or cut off the power  
1. Automatic fire 
extinguishing systems 
inside electrical cabinets 
Automatic fire extinguishing systems inside 
electrical cabinets prevent spreading of fire to the 
surrounding spaces and reduce damage to 
equipment. Attention should be paid to defining 
the capacity of the extinguishing system.  
 
 
 
 
 
> Without extinguishing systems inside cabinets, fires 
can spread to surrounding spaces                                                                                                                                       
> Capacity of the extinguishing system is too small to 
extinguish the fire    
> Too large capacity of the aerosol or gas extinguishing 
system builds up pressure and increases the fire instead 
of extinguishing it. 
2. Automatic fire 
detection, alarm and 
extinguishing systems in 
engine spaces 
Automatic and effective fire detection and alarm 
systems provide ship systems and remote 
operation centres information about the 
situation without delay. Detector locations, types 
and number of detectors should be planned 
carefully. Automatic extinguishing systems are 
the quickest and safest way to extinguish engine 
room fires in autonomous vessels. Firefighters 
may not be able to enter the engine spaces 
physically at all. Attention should be paid to 
choosing the right type of extinguishing systems 
and defining the right capacity for the space. 
> Fire in engine spaces cannot be detected                                                                                  
> Alarm systems are not connected directly to the 
remote monitoring centres; the information about the 
situation is not forwarded                                                                       
> Fire fighters may not be able to enter or extinguish the 
fire in the engine room 
> Extinguishing systems are not capable to extinguish the 
fire 
11. Passengers starting a fire 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
10. Smoke detectors and 
automatic fire 
extinguishing systems in 
passenger spaces 
Smoke detectors are the most suitable devices to 
detect fires in passenger spaces. However, the 
use of flame detectors additionally could also be 
considered. It is essential to get the information 
about fires immediately. Delays in this 
information endanger the whole rescue 
operation. When choosing extinguishing systems 
for passenger spaces the safety of the passenger 
should be priority number one. For example, low 
pressure water mist systems with concealed 
nozzles is a safe and reliable option in an 
unmanned vessel 
> Fire in passenger spaces is not detected                                                                                         
> Extinguishing systems are not capable to extinguish the 
fire 
25. No smoking signs on 
piers and vessels 
No smoking signs inform the passengers that 
smoking on board is not allowed. Smoking is one 
of the most likely reasons for having fires in 
passenger spaces  
> Passengers smoke on-board and starts a fire 
11. Video surveillance 
systems 
Existence of video surveillance can prevent 
erratic behaviour. With active monitoring 
dangerous situations can also be identified in 
real-time and intervened. Reliable real-time data 
transfer ashore is an essential part of the system, 
if a human does the monitoring. Appropriate 
technical specifications of systems should be 
planned and implemented efficiently. Video 
surveillance systems have to be efficiently 
monitored. 
> Without active video surveillance the preventive factor 
cannot be achieved 
> Video material is not transferred ashore from the 
vessel in real time. 
> There is no reaction to situations captured by the video 
surveillance system 
> Video surveillance does not perform properly 
12. Both automatic and 
manual fire alarm systems 
in passenger spaces with 
direct access to remote 
monitoring centres 
It is essential to get information about fires 
immediately to remote monitoring centres.   
Delays in this information endanger the whole 
rescue operation. In some cases, passengers may 
notice fires earlier than automatic systems and 
need to be able to send alarms manually. 
Passengers need to be informed about activated 
alarms 
> Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to 
send an alarm about fires in passenger spaces                                                                                                                                                    
> Smoke detectors are activated but there is no alarm for 
passengers                                               
> Alarm systems are not connected directly to the 
remote monitoring centres, the information about the 
situation is not forwarded 
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26. Use of inflammable 
and fire resistant 
materials in passenger 
spaces 
The material used in passenger spaces has 
significant effect on passenger safety in case of 
fires. The amount of plastic should be kept low 
> Flammable and non-fire resistant materials allow the 
fire to spread quickly
3. Possibility for the 
passengers to extinguish 
fires
Firefighting equipment on board should be easily 
available, simple, safe and easy to use for 
untrained persons. The equipment should be 
placed so that it cannot be easily tampered with, 
e.g. inside a cabinet with an alarm if opened 
> Firefighting  equipment available are too complicated 
to be used for untrained people 
> Firefighting equipment are not properly located, 
missing or not ready for use. 
12. Unintended falling over board + 13. Intended jumping over board
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
17. Vessel design with 
closed and “unclimbable” 
reeling e.g.  transparent 
inward curved plastic. 
The best way to prevent mob situations is to 
design vessels from the beginning so that it is 
impossible or at least very difficult to jump or fall 
overboard from them. Emergency situations have 
to be taken into account already in the initial 
design phase. 
> Vessels have an open reeling structure (e.g. horizontal 
bars with large gaps in between) that allow for falling 
overboard.
> The reeling structure is easy to climb over
18. Vessel design with 
automated sliding door 
type passenger gates 
which don’t open unless 
the vessel is firmly 
,moored 
Well-designed door structures with pressure 
sensors etc. is an effective way to control the 
movement of passengers and prevent man over 
board  situations. Passenger safety in case of door 
malfunction has to be taken into account. 
> Vessel design with open ends like in cable ferries allows 
for passengers to fall/jump overboard
> If the doors open at the wrong time, passengers may
fall or jump over board 
4. Manual alarm systems 
in passenger spaces and 
piers with direct contact 
to remote monitoring 
centres 
It is essential to get the information about man 
over board situations immediately to the 
rescuers when someone falls or jumps into the 
water.  Delays in this information endanger the 
whole rescue operation. 
> Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to 
send alarms about man over board situations 
 > Alarm systems are not connected directly to the 
remote monitoring centres, the information about the 
situation is not forwarded 
27. Video surveillance 
systems 
If a person travels alone or falls over board 
without other passengers noticing, the situation 
can only be detected by technical means. Reliable 
real-time data transfer ashore is an essential part 
of the system if monitoring is done by a human. 
Existence of video surveillance can prevent 
erratic behaviour. With active monitoring a 
person can also interfere with  situations. 
Appropriate technical specifications of the 
systems should be planned and implemented 
efficiently. The video surveillance systems have 
to be monitored continuously 
> Man over board situations are not noticed, because 
there is no video surveillance system to monitor 
passenger safety onboard 
 > Video material from vessels is not monitored 
continuously automatically or manually 
> Video material is not transferred ashore from vessels 
in real time 
> There is no reaction to situations captured by video 
surveillance systems
> Without active video surveillance the preventive factor 
cannot be achieved 
> Video surveillance does not perform properly 
28. Passenger instructions 
on piers and on board for 
man over board situation 
Other passengers on board are the best available 
resource in emergency situations, if they know 
what to do. Good passenger information is clear, 
simple and doesn’t leave place for 
misunderstandings. If the information is visually 
interesting and the means for providing it are 
correct, people are more likely to read, listen to 
or watch it.   
> Passenger instructions are poor or not easy enough to 
understand
> Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the 
instructions 
5. Remote monitoring 
centre to calm down and 
instruct people by voice 
after the alarm 
Calming passengers if necessary in order to keep 
them functional and prevent irrational actions 
that make the situation worse. With detailed 
instructions, untrained people are able to 
perform operations they would not be able to do 
on their own. Persons giving instructions have to 
be well trained in LSA functions as well as in 
crowd and crisis management. Connections 
between vessels and shore have to be reliable 
and there have to be redundancies. 
> People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act 
irrationally, because there is no system for instructing 
people by voice 
> Connections between vessels and monitoring centres
do not work 
> The way of giving instructions is not suitable and they
are not followed onboard 
6. Vessels to stop 
automatically in case of 
man over board alarms 
Stopping vessels without delay after an alarm 
protects persons in the water and ensures that 
they can get all available help. The propeller of 
the vessels should be properly covered if the 
engines are running at the man over board scene 
> Vessels are not programmed to stop in case of mob 
alarms and persons in the water get into the moving 
vessel’s propeller 
> Persons cannot be found in the water and/or 
passengers are not able to assist because the vessel has 
continued on her route.
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7. Well planned and 
rehearsed procedures, 
suitable equipment and 
clear roles between 
authorities for recovering 
persons from the water 
In man over board situations there is no time for 
planning, only for well-rehearsed action. Man 
over board situations may happen in areas where 
help is not close by. Co-operation between 
authorities increases the amount of available 
resources and speeds up the rescuing. 
> Assistance for recovering persons from the water takes 
too long to arrive.  
8. Possibility for other 
passengers or the vessel 
to assist or recover a 
person in the water  
Even if vessels are designed to protect people and 
keep them inside, there must be emergency exits 
and devices that can be used to pull a person on 
board from the water. All LSA-equipment on 
board should be easily available, simple, safe and 
easy to use for an untrained person. Automatic 
LSA equipment such as lifebuoys, ladders, slides, 
ramps, or emergency lighting should be 
automatically activated.  
> Vessels’ hull and structure are designed so “safe” that 
the passengers on board cannot assist or rescue anyone 
from the water                                                                                   
> LSA equipment available are too complicated to be 
used by untrained people 
> Without automatic LSA equipment operated by the 
vessel, persons in the water may not get help 
9. Automatic warning 
messages to be sent to  
surrounding vessels 
Other vessels in the area are most likely the 
fastest available assistance, but only if they know 
the situation. Without information about the 
situation, they are an imminent danger to 
persons in the water. 
> Autonomous vessels do not inform surrounding vessels 
about man over board situations and therefore other 
vessels cannot assist. 
> Autonomous vessels do not inform surrounding vessels 
about the man over board situation and another vessel 
runs over the person in the water 
14. Persons getting injured + 15. Medical conditions 
Safety Control (SC) Control logic principle Risks mitigated 
29. Good lighting and air 
conditioning 
Good lighting ensures that passengers can move 
safely. With proper temperature on board,  
passengers remain calm and alert, and it reduces 
the risk of seizures and medical conditions  
> Persons cannot see an obstruction and fall accidentally                                                                        
 > High temperatures can trigger seizures or medical 
conditions 
19. Unobstructed access 
and non-slippery floor 
materials in piers and 
vessels 
Unobstructed access and non-slippery floor 
materials in piers and vessels ensure that 
passengers can move safely in all weather 
conditions 
> Entrance to vessels is not level                                                                                                  
> Vessel or pier floors are made with slippery coating and 
passengers fall 
4. Manual alarm systems 
in the passenger spaces 
and piers with direct 
contact to remote 
monitoring centres 
It is essential to get the information about 
medical emergencies immediately to the 
authorities.  Delays in this information endanger 
the safety of the patient 
> Passengers on board have no easy and quick way to 
send alarms about medical emergencies                                                                                                                                                       
> Alarm systems are not connected directly to remote 
monitoring centres, information about the situation is 
not forwarded 
10. Vessels re-route to 
closest medical 
evacuation pier and 
transmits position to the 
authorities 
Patient safety has to be prioritized and medical 
attention reached as soon as possible. Special 
attention should be paid to the information flow 
and the planning of the emergency harbours.  
> Vessels continue to next planned pier and there is a 
delay for the patient to get the medical attention 
needed.                                                                             
> The information about the emergency does not reach 
the authorities or it is incorrect 
27. Video surveillance 
systems 
If persons travel alone, situations can only be 
detected by technical means. Reliable real-time 
data transfer ashore is an essential part of the 
system if a human does the monitoring. Technical 
specifications of systems should be planned and 
implemented efficiently. Video surveillance 
systems have to be monitored continuously. 
> Medical emergencies are not noticed, because there is 
no video surveillance system to monitor passenger 
safety on board                                                                                              
> Video material from vessels is not monitored 
continuously automatically or manually                                                                                                                                                           
> Video material is not transferred ashore from vessels 
in real time                              
> There is no reaction to situations captured by video 
surveillance systems               
> Video surveillance does not perform properly 
11. Passenger instructions 
on quay and on board for 
medical emergencies 
Other passengers on board are the best available 
resource in emergencies, if they know what to do. 
Good passenger information is clear, simple and 
does not leave place for misunderstandings. If the 
information is visually interesting and the means 
for providing it are correct, people are more likely 
to read, listen to or watch it.   
> Passenger instructions are poor or not easy enough to 
understand                                                                                                         
> Passengers do not familiarize themselves with the 
instructions 
5. Remote monitoring 
centres to calm down and 
instruct people by voice 
after alarms 
Calming of passengers if necessary in order to 
keep them functional and prevent irrational 
actions that make situations worse. With detailed 
instructions, untrained people are able to 
perform operations they would not be able to do 
on their own. Persons giving instructions have to 
be well trained in medical first aid as well as in 
crowd and crisis management. Connections 
between vessel and shore have to be reliable and 
there have to be redundancies. 
> People on board panic, don’t know what to do or act 
irrationally, because the system for instructing people by 
voice does not exist 
> Connections between vessels and monitoring centres 
do not work                    
> The way of giving instructions is not suitable and the 
instructions are not followed on board 
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12. Well planned and 
rehearsed procedure for 
medical evacuation 
In medical emergencies, there is no time for 
planning, only for well-rehearsed action.  Medical 
emergencies may happen in areas where help is 
not close by. Co-operation between authorities 
increases the amount of available resources and 
speed up the process. 
> Medical assistance takes too long to arrive        
13. Possibility for other 
passengers to give first 
aid to injured persons 
First aid equipment on board should be easily 
available, simple, safe and easy to use for 
untrained persons. First aid equipment should be 
placed so that it cannot be easily tampered with, 
e.g.  inside cabinets with alarms if opened 
> There is no first aid equipment available 
> First aid equipment available is too complicated to be 
used for untrained people.                                                                                                                          
 
 
Figure 1 below presents the types of safety controls utilized for the prevention and response to the 
defined accidents shown on the top of the table. The types of safety controls are marked with the 
same color codes as in Table 2. Each coded square represents a single safety control and the codes 
H1-H14 show which hazard these controls are connected to in each accident. By connecting the hazard 
number and the safety control number on the left-hand side column, details of the safety control in 
question can be found in Table 2.  
Figure 1. Safety control types utilized for prevention and response to defined accidents 
 
 
 
Distribution of the safety control types based on the mitigation approach in the initial safety 
management strategy for ferry A and B is presented in table 3. 27 % of the controls focus on 
implementing actions, which attempt to eliminate the hazard. 18 % of the safety controls focus on 
implementing actions to reduce the likelihood that the hazard will result in an accident. 18 % of the 
controls focus on implementing actions to reduce the damage if the accident occurs. 
 
 
Safety Control
(SC)
1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H1 H10
2 H2 H1 H4 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H4 H2 H4 H2 H4 H10
3 H2 H1 H4 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H4 H2 H4 H2 H4 H11
4 H3 H1 H4 H3 H1 H3 H1 H3 H1 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 H12 H12 H12
5 H3 H1 H4 H3 H1 H3 H1 H3 H1 H4 H3 H4 H3 H4 H12 H12 H12
6 H4 H2 H4 H2 H2 H4 H2 H4 H4 H2 H4 H4 H2 H4 H12
7 H6 H2 H2 H2 H6 H2 H4 H2 H4 H2 H8 H12
8 H2 H2 H2 H2 H2 H2 H7 H9 H12
9 H3 H3 H3 H3 H3 H3 H7 H9 H12
10 H3 H3 H3 H3 H3 H3 H7 H11 H14 H14
11 H4 H4 H4 H4 H7 H11 H14 H14
12 H4 H4 H4 H4 H8 H11 H14 H14
13 H6 H6 H6 H6 H8 H14 H14
14 H6 H6 H6 H6 H9
15 H6 H6 H6 H6 H9
16 H6 H6 H6 H6 H10
17 H6 H6 H6 H6 H12
18 H8 H12
19 H8 H14 H14
20 H9
21 H9
22 H10
23 H10
24 H10
25 H11
26 H11
27 H12 H14 H14
28 H12
29 H12 H14 H14
Total SC 24 15 12 10 9 930 16 16 30 24
Accident
9 101 2,1 2,2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SC control strategy:
Attempt to eliminate the hazard
Reduce the likelihood that the hazard will occur
Reduce the likelihood that the hazard results in an accident
Reduce the damage if the accident occur
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Table 3. Distribution of the safety control types used 
Safety control mitigation approach Safety controls 
defined 
Attempt to completely eliminate the hazard 19 
Attempt to reduce the likelihood that the hazard will occur 29 
Attempt to reduce the likelihood that the hazard results in an 
accident 
12 
Attempt to reduce the damage if the accident occurs 13 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This report presents a systematic hazard analysis prior to the concept design phase of an autonomous 
vessel. The process consists of five different steps to elaborate a systematic analysis of hazards and to 
define safety controls for mitigating and preventing the identified hazards. These safety controls are 
the basis of the initial safety management strategy of autonomous vessels and their operational 
system. 
The process is suitable for analysing hazards and proposing safety controls with a systematic approach 
that covers the operational context of autonomous vessels. The process was applied to analyse two 
concepts of autonomous ferries operating in urban waterways in Finland. As an outcome of the 
process, ten accidents were defined and fifteen hazards identified. The result of the analysis is an 
initial safety management strategy composed of 73 safety controls. The controls provide itemized 
information that is relevant for planning, designing and constructing autonomous vessels and their 
entire operational system. 
The process application promotes an anticipated involvement of different key stakeholders for 
planning the management of safety for autonomous vessels and their operational system. The 
implementation of the process produces initial itemized information, which can guide the initial design 
process of autonomous vessels and their entire operational system. The aim is to initiate the design 
of safety in the earliest conceptual design phase for engineering more efficient and safer autonomous 
ferries and systems. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The background and expertise areas for each participating expert 
 
A: Master mariner and master of marine technology with over 14 years of seagoing experience as 
marine officer, and about 5 years of experience from maritime administration as senior inspector and 
marine safety investigator. 
B:  Senior researcher with about 4 years of practical experience in quality and safety management of 
maritime traffic and port logistics, and over 5 years of experience in the research of safety and risk 
management practices implemented in the maritime industry.  
C:  Shipbuilding engineer with over 14 years of experience in ship design and technical management 
in the maritime industry and about six years of experience from classification societies. 
D: Design and production engineer with over six years of experience as project manager and director 
in smart mobility and transport automation projects. 
E: Sea captain with ten years of seagoing experience as marine officer and shipmaster, and 20 years 
of experience in the maritime simulator training and simulator environment development in a 
maritime college.   
F: Doctor of technology, specialized in control engineering, automation and system identification. The 
expert has over six years of experience in the marine electric and automation industry and is currently 
a manager of intelligent shipping in one of the leading technology companies in the field. 
G: Doctor of philosophy specialized in positioning technologies. The expert has over ten years of 
experience in the development of GNNS products and over four years of experience in researching 
geodesy, geoinformatics, navigation, remote sensing and spatial data infrastructure. 
H: Software engineer with over ten years of experience as designer of software and algorithms for 
automation and energy domains. Specialized in critical and high-reliability systems. 
I: Naval architect with 14 years of experience in ship design and construction, and works currently as 
managing director of a shipyard. The expert also has over 9 years of technical ship management 
experience from a shipping company. 
J: Coast guard officer with a total of 28 years of experience of maritime search and rescue work, of 
which seven years as a search and rescue mission coordinator. 
K: Fire engineer with about ten years of rescue service experience specialized in fire inspections and 
contingency planning in chemical sites and ports. Currently the expert works as leading fire inspector 
in charge of developing control activities for the South West Finland rescue area. 
L: Ship owner with over 20 years of experience in ship management and practical ship operations, and 
12 years of experience as ferry captain in the Finnish archipelago. The expert also acts as safety 
manager (DPA) of a shipping company. 
M: City risk manager with a master’s degree in engineering. This expert is in charge of the safety and 
security strategies and their implementation in one the largest cities of Finland. 
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N: Master mariner with five years of seagoing experience as marine officer and 11 years of experience 
as survival instructor in a maritime safety training centre. The expert also has experience in 
development and evaluation of marine lifesaving equipment. 
O: Master mariner with three years of seagoing experience as marine officer and 10 years of 
experience as simulator instructor and training manager in a maritime college. 
P: Master mariner with five years of experience in developing maritime on-board solutions. The expert 
currently works as CEO of a company focusing on maritime IT/ICT/IoT/telematics and safety systems.  
Q:  Naval architect with over five years of experience in the implementation of maritime safety 
regulations for ship design and construction. The expert also has over 3 years of experience in 
researching the interaction between sea ice and ship structures. 
R: Chief engineer with 18 years of seagoing experience as marine engineer. The expert is also the 
safety manager (DPA) in a shipping company specialized in operating public transportation routes in a 
city area. 
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